1) In what ways is aid being militarised and is aid being used to support      militarisation ?

• Today's wars involve systems of co-operation between military actors and aid agencies.

• According to International Humanitarian Law, one of the most important principles of humanitarian aid are unconditionality and impartiality - non-combatants are entitled to assistance and protection on the basis of need and not according to their political affiliation, religion, race or creed or a military strategy.

• Today, this principle is undermined by the increasing militarisation of international humanitarian action within a wider trend towards the politicisation of aid; aid has become an instrument of international foreign and security policy.

• Three possible roles for the military: providing security for humanitarian workers to operate, supporting agencies’ work with logistical and protection services, or providing direct assistance to the population themselves.

  a) The military and mis(use) of humanitarian aid

• witholding of aid as a means of leverage to achieve political or military purposes;
• in zones of conflict, growing military involvement in the distribution of humanitarian aid and related work usually carried out by humanitarian agencies;
• instrument of political intervention in violent conflicts; humanitarian label has increasingly been used by policy-makers to explain or justify political or military action;
• in particular humanitarian aid is used as a weapon in the war on terrorism; foreign aid has become more selective and used for political purposes under the pretext of fighting terrorism;
• most extreme form is the characterisation of military action as humanitarian;
• moreover, there has been militarisation of aid given to populations affected by natural disasters, such as hurricans, earthquakes, and the recent Tsunami;
• aid as a way to increase support among the local population and at home in reaction to the media spotlight;
• Western government often assign humanitarian groups a strategic role in wars (see in particular examples on US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan and UK strategy of coherence).

b) Humanitaran agencies and the use of military

• Conversely, in wars where population movement and relief supplies were strategic assets, humanitarian workers became part of the struggle. As the political element of humanitarian action became more explicit, neutrality – and the safety it was thought to provide – eroded. Seeking protection from international military forces or even UN peacekeepers, as some humanitarian workers did, further underlined the tension between the need for security and the principle of neutrality;

• Increased operational challenges and risks of humanitarian missions have made military assistance necessary in order to deliver aid;

• Contact between the military and humanitarian workers in three key areas: use of military assets, such as aircrafts, to assist agencies in delivering aid; the use of military forces to protect relief supplies, convoys and stuff against theft and attack; and information sharing;

• Military forces are seen as a pool of prepared, disciplined and available source of assistance while the international aid community gears itself for action.

2.1. ASEM governments

• ASEM governments : Austria, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, China, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, Vietnam.

• Humanitarian aid of many western countries is political:it is often used to promote values of liberal economic and political policy internationally in order to protect national interests, e.g. trade, national security, control of drugs, refugees. Increasingly, states who do not share this framework are excluded from international relations, for example they are excluded from receiving aid.

Concept of ‘Coherence’ : trade, development initiatives, humanitarian aid, diplomacy, and even military intervention collaborate in working to achieve peace and international stability.

• UK has, more than other European ASEM countries, integrated humanitarian aid into a framework of political and military responses to conflicts.
• UN Peacekeepers have mostly been involved in humanitarian aid; the 2000 Brahimi Report on the improvement of peace-missions recommended to use aid as a tool for conflict transformation.
• UN concept of a “Strategic Framework” in Afghanistan provided that all measures were to be oriented towards a uniform strategy, turning humanitarian aid into an instrument of foreign and security policy.
• 1999 NATO “Strategic Concept” and the 2000 “Concept of civil-military cooperation” give NATO forces a wide range of tasks including humanitarian aid.
• EU: 1997 Treaty on the creation of a “Rapid Reaction Force” (RRF); the mandate includes military as well as humanitarian tasks.

But principles to prevent the manipulation of aid for military purposes do exist: The use of the military for humanitarian purposes would have to respect the international norms and principles governing humanitarian assistance. Such an approach is actually shared and endorsed at the UN level, with the support of many States, including EU Member States and major humanitarian actors. Guidelines on “the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” have been established, clarifying the respective roles of military and humanitarian actors in the conduct of humanitarian operations.

According to the UK Ministry of Defence’s Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), the UK’s operational principles guiding engagement in humanitarian activities are :

• if at all possible, do not get involved in humanitarian aid activities;
• if UK forces must get involved, this should be in support of a lead civilian agency, where the military stays in the background; and
• only as a last resort would the military get directly involved in aid delivery, namely if the humanitarian assistance process was seen as failing. NATO’s principles are similar. conditions under which involvement will occur:
• always in collaboration with mandated organisations;
• with a finite plan of what, why and how long humanitarian work will last, and a clear strategy for handing over operations to the relevant agency; and
• with the aim of withdrawing from humanitarian activities as soon as possible.

Still there is a trend towards the militarisation of aid :

War on terror :

• It has been noted that the Bush and Al Qaeda doctrines mirror each other. Both say, “You are either or or against us.” This dualistic world view leaves little space for neutral, impartial, and independent humanitarian action. The situation presents some similarities with the Cold War polarization, with one ominous additional feature: the direct threat against aid workers who because of their mode of fun-ding, nationalities, lifestyle, values, and perceived identification with the objectives of the “western conspiracy” are considered fair and soft targets by embattled, ruthless, and violent militant extremist groups.

Iraq :

• Iraq represents a peak to date in the erosion of humanitarian principles
• Difficulties of humanitarian agencies to decide on how to interact with the Occupying Power, both as a donor of humanitarian resources and as a military and political actor on the humanitarian stage in Iraq.
• Most humanitarian actors seem to agree that the Iraq crisis has resulted in a dangerous blurring of the lines between humanitarian and political action and in the consequent erosion of the core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Serious compro-mises from which it will be difficult to disentangle have been made. The bombs directed against the UN headquarters in Baghdad have added a tragic element to widespread fears and concerns about the future of independent and effective humanitarian action.
• Coordination of the humanitarian effort in such crises is always a challenge. In Iraq, the task was complicated by the divergent positions taken by NGOs. Some, primarily American, NGOs chose to “engage” and therefore agreed to comply with the funding requirements and other dictates of the Occupying Power (OP). Others, primarily European, “kept their distance” and refused US (and UK) funding and/or declined to interact with the OP.
• By accepting to work there in the context of the US-led occupation, humanitarian agencies have put themselves in an ambiguous and dangerous position. Enormous pressure has been brought to bear on the UN, including its humanitarian wing, to perform a subordinate role to the US-led intervention -- this despite the lack of a formal SC blessing to the military opera-tion. Financial and political pressure on US NGOs has been even more overwhelming. Such pressures have resulted in the UN, the assis-tance community, and even the ICRC being seen as taking sides. As a result, the ICRC emblem and the blue flag have lost their capacity to protect.

Afghanistan : military operations with humanitarian components :

• The multinational International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is also involved in humanitarian support projects in and around Kabul.
• The US-led coalition force conducted offensive military operations and, at the same time, implemented a humanitarian support programme throughout the country.
• In 2002, Colin Powell described NGOs as a ‘force mulitplier’ for the US military in Afghanistan and the US government, like many other countries, regards humanitarian deliveries as a part of their military strategy and as a means to achieve specific political aims.
• US aid force dropped food; but this was merely a political gesture for the Afghan people, but according to MSF, such untargeted aid doesn’t reach the poorest and most needy people.
• While humanitarian agencies have been careful to avoid criticism of the conduct of the war, many have openly condemned the well-publicized US military policy of high altitude food drops as “a purely propaganda tool, of little real value to the Afghan people.”.

Aid agencies have left Afghanistan for fear of being targeted because they are identified with the coalition. The United Nations has drastically reduced operations; all but a few aid workers have withdrawn from Afghanistan and now wait across the border.

The recent changes in Japanese ODA canbe described as a “militarization of aid”. significant points: (1) the adoption of a broader definition of terrorism and the introduction of major anti-terrorism legislation; (2) the redefinition of aid and ODA within the framework of geopolitical interests; and (3) the allocation of ODA more on the basis of a selectivity and conditionality that reflects the interests of the donor, particularly under the rhetoric of “opposing terrorism.”.

Take China and Tsunami aid :

• In the lead up to the UN-sponsored tsunami summit in Jakarta on January 6 2005, the Beijing bureaucracy announced, with considerable fanfare, an unprecedented assistance package totalling $83 million for the victims of the disaster.
• Assistance is motivated not by concern for the tsunami victims, but rather by economic and political considerations: rivalry between China and Taiwan for influence and economic advantages, especially in the Asia Pacific region.

Earthquake in Asia 2005 :

1. National militarisation : The militarisation of aid and reconstruction is expanding. The Federal government of Pakistan, dominated by the generals, has issued a notification to tent manufacturers and importers that states that the companies must only sell tents to the military and not to NGOs and other organisations. All the foreign aid is also kept and distributed by the military.
2. International militarisations : The arrival and involvement of US and NATO troops in Pakistan has furthered the militarisation of relief and rehabilitation work. Yet the overwhelming majority of the Pakistani population is against the presence of these forces. The US and European powers want to use their troop deployment in Pakistan to try to improve the image of the imperialists powers. They are not involved in any real relief activity on the ground. Some in the media comment that the main purpose of the US and NATO troops are not to take part in the relief and rehabilitation work but to hunt for Osama-Bin-Ladan and other Al-Qaeda leaders.

“Interventionist” policies of the US and its allies, calling for an end to such policies particularly in the Philippines, Nepal, India, Indonesia, Africa and Colombia. In the Philippines, there is an ntensification of US intervention under the pretext of fighting terrorism and at the expense of the people’s civil liberties

The use of humanitarian aid as a weapon of war is not new. In Rwanda, after the Hutus systematically killed a half a million Tutsis in 1994, Hutu leaders fled to neighboring Zaire (now Congo) and used the safety and resources of U.N. refugee camps to mount further attacks on Tutsi forces. The West ended up protecting killers in the rush to house, feed and clothe refugees.

Aid agencies often have to pay the price for the confusion between military and humanitarian objectives: Security fears have forced aid agencies in Kashmir, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya and Somalia to reduce work, depriving many people of badly needed assistance

In Aug 2006, the Sri Lankan government troops, which are in a civil war with Tamil rebels, killed 17 aid workers of ‘Action against Hunger’who were working on Tsunami relief projects; all but one were ethnic Tamils.

2.2. Civil society organizations

• Most NGOs have at one time or another cooperated with military forces in execution of their aid acitivities.
• Civil society organisations have an ambiguos role.
• On the one hand, many of them have taken a stand against the manipulation of humanitarian assistance by political or military interests, for example Médecins Sans Frontières:
• Example for NGO campaign against aid manipulation: when Zimbabwe’s government use food aid to punish supporters of a Western-backed democratic oppostion movement.
• On the other hand, NGOs often remain silent where manipulation of aid concerned undemocratic or ‘anti-US’ regimes.
• Some of them are even accused of being directly involved in the misuse of aid; (e.g. Norwegians People’s Aid has been blamed for supporting the war efforts of southern rebels; NPA had for several years organised an air-bridge for the supply of weapons to battle zones within Sudan under the supervision of its Nairobi office; Many sources, including some within the NPA.confirm that food relief has also been used to feed SPLA troops. source: The European Sudanese Public Affairs Council (privately funded organisation): “Perpetuating Conflict and Sustaining Repression. Norwegian People’s aid and the militarisation of aid in Sudan”; article based on findings of Norwegian Television Documentary; http://www.espac.org/norwegian_pages/norwegian_aid.asp )un to punish political supporters of the Western-backed opposition Movement for Democrati to punish political supporters of the Western-backed orters of the Western-backed opposition Movement for Democratic Change.

• Humanitarian aid is a limited instrument that can be used to prevent excess mortality and morbidity, but is not designed to resolve wars. The fact that relief is increasingly associated with western foreign policy compromises security and access.
• The manipulation of aid could impede humanitarian agencies from reaching people caught in conflict, independently on which side of the front line they are.
• Aid can fuel conflict, but allocating aid on the basis of conflict dynamics and not on the basis of need might also support peace.
• Humanitarianism is not a tool to end war or to create peace. It is a citizens’ response to political failure.
• Manipulation of aid according to the media spotlight and current military strategies: At the same time that money started flowing from American coffers to Iraq, the U.S. cut $1 billion from its contribution to the World Food Program. According to the 2003 International Red Cross Catastrophe Report, that directly affected 40 million Africans in some 22 countries. Since the beginning of the Iraq war, the German Red Cross has collected more than €4 million ($3.5 million) for humanitarian efforts there. In the same period, donations for Africa barely amounted to €100,000 ($115,000). Scarcity of relief might in turn foster conflict.
• Any operation undertaken jointly by humanitarian agencies with military/security actors may have a negative impact on the perception of the humanitarian agencies’ impartiality and neutrality as well as on their security; serious, practical consequences for aid workers, danger.
• Only when aid organizations can claim absolutely neutrality are they respected and largely left alone by the warring factions.
• Serious consequences for the ability to access certain areas and the safety of humanitarian staff, as well as cause potential long-term damage to the standing of humanitarian agencies in the region and in other crisis areas, especially if humanitarian assistance is perceived as being selective, politically driven and/or partial.

• A first area to be addressed could be that of defining the term “humanitarian”.
• While aid and politics can complement each other, they are not interchangeable, having different constituencies, rules and objectives. Rather than work towards coherence, political actors should tackle the fundamental causes of conflict and enable development and humanitarian agencies to operate more effectively.
• It is important that impartial humanitarian assistance and the inevitably partial and political operations of military forces are kept seperate.
• Poverty reduction should be the primary driving force of aid.
• Humanitarian actor must maintain the lead role for humanitatrian action in any situation.
• ‘Do no harm’ approach, aid has to be used in a way that does not fuel conflict or contributes to human rights violations.
• Donor governments should commit themselves in law to maintaining the impartial and neutral character of humanitarian assistance.
• Humanitarian agencies should be encouraged in their efforts to achieve higher standards of accountability and effectiveness.

1. Operational independence of humanitarian action : Humanitarian actors must retain full control of their humanitarian operations. Agencies must ensure that their operational independence is guaranteed at all times, e.g. on issues involving freedom of movement, recruitment of national and international staff, non-integration into military planning and action, access to communications, etc. Humanitarian action must be conducted separately and clearly distinguished from military-led relief operations.

2. Access to all vulnerable populations : The principle of humanity requires that suffering must be addressed wherever it is encountered. Humanitarian actors must maintain their ability to obtain access to all vulnerable populations in all parts of the country and to negotiate such access directly with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must be taken to ensure the sustainability of access.

3. Neutral and impartial aid distribution : Humanitarian actors must ensure that all vulnerable populations receive aid in an equitable, neutral and impartial manner and without any political conditions attached. Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination, on the basis of "needs only" - i.e., without outside interference with humanitarian needs assessments and responses.

• Humanitarian Policy Group – Overseas Development Institute;
• Humanitarian Practice Network – Overseas Development Institute;
• VENRO;
• Journal of Humanitarian Assistance;
• Reliefweb;
• id 21. Communicating development research;
• ICRC;
• Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group / OCHA;
• Pacific Asia Resource Center;
• Caritas Internationalis;
• BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development);
• International Herald Tribune;
• Oxfam;
• Center for Strategic Decision Research;
• Deutsche Welle/ dw-world;
• Socialistworld.net (about earthquake in Asia).

More on Militarisation of Aid

• Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship [2003]
• Humanitarian Action and the "Global War on Terror" [2004]
• Media and the Instrumentalisation of Aid, Military Involvement in Distribution of Aid [2003]
• Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response [2002]
• Cooperation between Aid Organisations and Armed Forces in Humanitarian Aid [2003]
• Civil-Military Relationships in Complex Emergencies [2004]
• Guidelines on the Use of Military Support for UN Humanitarian Activities [2003]
• Country Examples - Humanitarian Aid as Political Weapon [2006]
• Iraq - Humanitarian-Military Relations with Guidelines [2003]
• Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan with Recommendations [2002]
• NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis [2000]