Report from the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, 23-25 May 2007 (Part 1)

I  SUMMARY:
From 23-25 May 2007, over 250 participants from some 70 countries, 10 international organizations, and over 30 non-governmental organizations gathered in Lima, Peru to continue efforts to produce a legally binding instrument prohibiting the use of cluster munitions which pose unacceptable harm to civilians.

The Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions is the continuation of the process initiated in Oslo, from 23-25 February 2007, where 46 states signed a declaration pledging to negotiate a treaty on cluster munitions by 2008.

The Conference undoubtedly demonstrated the growing political will and momentum to work toward the negotiation of a treaty that will address and prevent the humanitarian suffering caused by the use of these indiscriminate and disproportionate weapons.

At Lima, 28 States joined what is now referred to as the Oslo process, strengthening its effective potential and bringing valuable perspectives from affected countries in diverse regions. Hungary declared a national moratorium on the use of cluster munitions and Peru announced its initiative to create the world’s first cluster munitions-free zone in Latin America.

Discussions during the Lima Conference were constructive and fruitful and contributed to the successful completion of the Conference’s objectives. The purpose of the Conference was to facilitate an exchange of views and create a better understanding of the problems associated with the use of cluster munitions. The Conference was not convened to negotiate the text of a future instrument—instead it was intended as a forum to hold discussions on elements to be included in a future treaty and to create a solid platform to serve as a basis for negotiations at a later date. States were able to fulfill these objectives during the Conference and reached broad consensus on six main essential areas for inclusion in a new international instrument, such as obligations to provide victim assistance; provisions on clearance; storage and stockpile destruction; international cooperation and assistance; transparency, compliance, and national measures; and procedural issues.

KEY ISSUES
Victim Assistance:
States overwhelmingly agreed that victim assistance should form the cornerstone of a future instrument. Many delegations and civil society participants emphasized the importance of risk education and awareness programs, international cooperation and assistance, and protecting children, who comprise a disproportionate and excessive number of cluster munitions victims. There was also consensus on the need to employ a broad definition of ‘victim’ to include not only the individual, but family members and communities affected by the use of cluster munitions. A future treaty should also apply a rights based approach, ensuring non-discrimination and a full realization of victims’ human rights.

Clearance:
In discussions on clearance, there was agreement on the essential importance of clearance operations to enable affected communities to recover and rebuild. States concurred on the interdependence of risk education and clearance, the need to provide technical and financial assistance, as well as encourage national ownership, and obligations to identify, mark, and fence contaminated areas to protect civilians. Discussions will need to continue to reach consensus on the appropriate length of deadlines for clearance operations and possibilities for extensions however.
The Conference also heard from affected States about their experiences with cluster munitions clearance and from the CMC about the added difficulties that the supposedly ‘safer’ M85 cluster munitions pose to clearance operations.

Storage and Stockpile Destruction:
In the session on storage and stockpile destruction, the main issues discussed for possible inclusion in a future instrument were provisions for storage of cluster munitions and timelines, transparency, and technical challenges for the destruction of existing stocks, with an emphasis on safety, security, and environmental concerns. Participants agreed that destruction of cluster munitions would be an important issue for a future instrument, as cluster munitions are more costly, complex, and time consuming to destroy than landmines.
On the issue of deadlines and extensions for destruction of cluster munitions stocks, however, many States advocated increasing the time allotted for stockpile destruction in the Lima text and strengthening provisions for extensions.
Disappointingly, several delegations, including Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, and Ireland argued in favor of retaining live cluster munitions, even ones which pose unacceptable harm, for training and research purposes. This was firmly opposed by Canada, Norway, and the CMC, which informed the Conference that in the past, such arguments were used to as a cover-up to allow States to retain large stockpiles.
Germany alarmingly reiterated its statement that priority should be given to procuring new replacement weapons over the destruction of existing, dangerous stockpiles.
Finland, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic also advocated for provisions on a transition period, during which certain cluster munitions would still be permitted to be used, completely undermining any prohibitions contained in a future instrument.

Cooperation and Assistance:
Many States attached great importance to strengthening provisions for cooperation and assistance. Several States emphasized the crucial role that assistance plays for developing and affected countries, assistance and universalization of a future treaty are interrelated, and many developing countries will need help in meeting treaty obligations. Limited financial resources, rather than lack of political will, may be the determinant for their decision to sign a future instrument.

There was broad consensus that assistance must be provided in a comprehensive manner and with an aim to promote development and capacity building. Frameworks should be constructed to avoid duplicating existing efforts and ensuring that while some obligations should be assumed by affected States, the international community will be prepared to assist with others. Several States and the CMC also proposed that user states should bear special responsibilities and obligations.

Transparency, Compliance, and National Measures:
Discussions on transparency, compliance, and national measures were equally as constructive and fruitful. States and civil society agreed on the utility of the Mine Ban Treaty as a model and sought to improve areas relating to reporting mechanisms, transparency, and compliance. Delegations emphasized the value of translating the effective ‘family atmosphere’ towards compliance that exists in the Mine Ban Treaty framework to a new regime on cluster munitions.

All participants affirmed the importance of quality, accuracy, and timely submission of reports and the necessity of provisions explicitly requiring States to create national legislation and penal sanctions specific to cluster munitions to promote compliance. The Lima text also contains provisions for States to determine instances of non-compliance and possible steps for action, an element lacking in the Mine Ban Treaty.

Definitions:
While the discussions on the majority of the main elements of a future instrument were constructive and showed signs of promising consensus, participants expressed widely divergent views on a proposed definition for cluster munitions to be used in a future instrument. The issue will be the most significant hurdle for the negotiation of a future treaty as it will determine the scope and effectivity of a prohibition.

It was a positive sign that all delegations agreed on the necessity of banning some types of cluster munitions and acknowledged the grave humanitarian suffering caused by their use. However, certain delegations continued to advocate for the exemption of cluster munitions equipped with self-destruct mechanisms or with certain failure rates, despite repeated demonstrations by civil society and government officials of the inadequacy of technical fixes to protect civilians.

Australia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Poland, and the United Kingdom supported a limited ban exempting cluster munitions with self-destruct mechanisms. Others, such as Argentina, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland took a more moderate stance, stating that it is necessary to draw a line between those cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians and those that can be used responsibly, and create prohibitions on those cluster munitions which pose unacceptable harm to civilians.

Encouragingly, many other States and NGOs, such as Bosnia, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, Norway, Senegal, and Venezuela explicitly supported a total ban, stating all cluster munitions threaten civilians by their inherent design and function, and any harm is unacceptable. Despite the contention over the issue of a definition, it was beneficial that, in sharing their perspectives and positions, delegations helped clarify areas for future discussion and the circumstances in which negotiations will have to proceed.

CCW versus Oslo:
Another critical issue that continues to threaten the Oslo process’ chance for success remains the debate over the appropriate forum for work on an international prohibition. Although most participants support work in both the Oslo and CCW frameworks as potentially complementary processes, several delegations indicated a preference for work in the CCW and stated they will push for a negotiating mandate within that framework.

Germany has submitted a draft text on a possible Protocol VI on cluster munitions within the CCW that is competing with the Lima text for support. France has also circulated a draft paper on cluster munitions, calling for work within the CCW and provisions for a transition period and maintenance of minimal stocks. Both initiatives are significantly weaker than the prohibition contained in the Lima text and will not provide adequate protection for civilians.

In addition, the recent history of the CCW gives little realistic hope for substantive progress on a treaty prohibiting cluster munitions. Advocating for work within the CCW threatens to derail the Oslo process and any possible establishment of meaningful protections for civilians. The next meeting of the CCW process will take place in Geneva, from 19-22nd June. It would be optimal if both processes can move forward in a mutually reinforcing fashion to achieve results, but it appears more likely that certain states who want to retain their weapons will use the CCW as an opportunity to produce an extremely weak instrument or ensure that nothing is achieved at all.

Steps forward:
As the Conference concluded, there was a sense of optimism over the growing number of participants and the increasing demonstration of political will to take action and conclude a legally binding instrument banning cluster munitions which cause unacceptable harm to civilians by 2008. The productive and constructive discussions held during the Lima Conference are encouraging, but there is still much work to be done. Until participants reconvene in Vienna, civil society and those concerned about the humanitarian suffering caused by cluster munitions should strive to convince governments to join in the Oslo process, enact national measures and moratoria, abandon arguments in favor of definitions based on self-destruct mechanisms or failure rates, and reaffirm their commitments to the continuation of the fundamental humanitarian objectives set out in Oslo and reinforced in Lima.

Upcoming Schedule for the Oslo Process:
States holding follow-on meetings announced the coming schedule for the Oslo process:

1. Austria announced that the Vienna Conference will take place from 5th-7th December, with an NGO forum the day prior to the Conference. Austria stated it will endeavor to provide all assistance that NGOs might require.
2. New Zealand will host a meeting in Wellington from 18th-22nd February 2008.
3. Ireland announced that the Dublin meeting will take place over a two week period from the second half of May to early June 2008.
4. Costa Rica will host a regional meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean from the 23rd-24th August, with an NGO event a day prior, as it is dedicated to furthering the creation of a Latin American cluster munitions-free zone.

Belgium and Serbia are also planning regional meetings.

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ICBUW's third international appeal was released following the Human Cost of Uranium Weapons exhibition in the European Parliament on May 17th 2007. >From Berlaar to Hiroshima and now Brussels, it represents a continued call for action to ban the use of uranium in conventional weapon systems.

The European Parliament has shown that the people of Europe wish to see an end to the use of uranium weapons. Last year, parliamentarians called for an outright ban on their use; this built on three previous calls for a moratorium. On 22nd March this year, and after a unanimous vote in parliament, Belgium became the first country in the world to introduce a domestic ban on their manufacture, use, storage, sale, acquisition, supply and transit.

We call on all European governments to follow Belgium’s example and ban the use and manufacture of uranium weapons in their territories.

In Brussels, we have listened to the military, scientists and the victims of uranium weapons. From mine to battlefield, uranium products have been implicated in a trail of illness, environmental damage and death. The latest peer-reviewed research continues to highlight uranium’s ability to damage human health through its chemical toxicity and radioactivity, while claims by the nuclear industry and the military that low-level radiation is not harmful to human health must be rigorously challenged.

We call on scientists from all backgrounds to assist in assessing the dangers associated with the chemical and radiological toxicity of uranium. Its unique properties when aerosolized are a hazard to human health and the environment.

We strongly condemn the United States and United Kingdom, whose armed forces have used large quantities of uranium weapons in Iraq and the Balkans. Evidence that US forces continue to use uranium munitions in Afghanistan remains an area of genuine concern. The UK and particularly the US have also been active in the proliferation of uranium weapons to militaries worldwide.

We call on the media around the world, especially in the US and UK, to investigate the issue of uranium weapons. It is imperative that they inform citizens about the issue, and the global abolition movement.

The use of uranium weapons is illegal under international humanitarian, human rights and environmental law. The United Nations Human Rights Sub-Committee has condemned them, like nuclear, chemical and cluster munitions, as: weapons of indiscriminate destruction, with long-term consequences for the environment, human health and life, which cause civilian suffering for years after the cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, the dust created by DU weapons does not recognise national boundaries.

In light of this ruling, and a growing body of compelling scientific research, we support an adherence to the Precautionary Principle, and will use each and every legal tool and instrument at our disposal to secure the full implementation of a complete and lasting ban. ICBUW will follow in the successful footsteps of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munitions Coalition in pursuing an explicit treaty to ban the use of uranium in all conventional weapon systems.

We reiterate our support for ICBUW's Mission Statement, which calls for:

i) An immediate and universal ban on the military use of uranium and other radioactive materials.

ii) The cleaning up of all sites contaminated by these weapons with compensation for all affected populations.

iii) A halt to the production, testing, sale, stockpiling, transport and export of these weapons and a decommissioning of all existing stockpiles.

iv) The immediate medical assessment, treatment and long term monitoring of all those who have been exposed to uranium weaponry.

v) The full disclosure of all locations where uranium weapons have been used as well as the amounts of uranium involved.

vi) Financial support from organisations and individuals to provide independent medical and environmental investigations in affected countries.

vii) We call on governments to exclude their troops from alliance with any government that uses uranium munitions.

viii) The successful implementation of a Convention for a Total Ban of Uranium Weapons.

We, the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons, call on all states to support our Draft Resolution: Concerns About Weapons Containing Depleted Uranium at the UN First Assembly this autumn.

We also call on the international community to act now to support our campaign to prevent the continued chemical and radiological contamination of this, our shared Earth, and to support those populations already affected by military uranium pollution.

International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons
Bridge 5 Mill, 22a Beswick Street, Ancoats, Manchester, UK, M4 7HR
Telephone: +44 (0)161 273 8293 / 8283, Fax: +44 (0)161 273 8293
Email:info@bandepleteduranium.org
Web: www.bandepleteduranium.org

More on Uranium Weapons:
ICBUW Final Report on DU
Campaign against Depleted Uranium Newsletter
CHRR Concerns on Uranium Mining
Health and Environment Hazards of DU
Short Report from ICBUW Lobbying GENEVA May 2007