NATO, BUILDING GLOBAL INSECURITY

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The Olof Palme Report 2:
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Common Security or there will be a disaster!
Reiner Braun

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) presents an updated snapshot of the military alliance, taking into account the global context of simultaneous crises and the heightened tensions caused by the invasion of Ukraine.

NATO’s modus operandi are embodied in its Strategic Concepts, and from the two most recently approved we can draw some conclusions that help us understand the Alliance’s goals. On the one hand, it seeks to promote a broad conception of defence, which allows it to greatly expand its scope of action to deal with “new threats”, many of them non-military; there is also an attempt to relax its adherence to the United Nations Charter, in what has been described as the “legal deregulation of warfare”. NATO is also extending its geographical scope of action beyond what is established by the North Atlantic Treaty, as happened in the case of Afghanistan. Lastly, the democratic deficit with which this strategy is decided is noteworthy, bypassing the most basic rules of parliamentarism. In June 2022, a new Strategic Concept will be approved in Madrid, which is expected to emphasise reinforcement, deterrence and defence, which is equivalent to increasing all military capabilities, whether nuclear, conventional or cybernetic. It will also include an explicit reference to the relationship with China, which it considers to be a “systemic challenge”. Furthermore, it will state that it will not only respond to armed attacks, but that NATO could intervene militarily in the event of any threat to its security. Deterrence, based on an appropriate combination of nuclear and conventional capabilities, is and will be a central element of NATO’s strategy.

NATO was born in opposition to Moscow and, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which undoubtedly deserves total condemnation - among many reasons for the violation of state sovereignty protected by international law and the United Nations - the Alliance reinforces its legitimacy against it. However, this does not absolve NATO of responsibility for the contempt it has shown towards Russia, following its commitment not
to expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demand that Ukraine does not join the Atlantic Alliance. For Russia, the possibility that Ukraine joins NATO was perceived as a serious threat to its security. The Alliance’s leaders, however, have hardly invoked violations of international law to criticise Russia, perhaps because they have also excelled in this area themselves. They have thus chosen to push for a proxy war in Ukraine in order to resolve, by force, what they perceived as the first round of a new Cold War between NATO and Russia/China. In other words, the Alliance is going backwards and back to square one in its history, leaving no doubt as to its role: NATO is the best solution to the problems caused by NATO itself.

In this sense, the military Alliance, since its very foundation 73 years ago, has fought wars on an almost permanent basis. NATO’s involvement in wars such as those in Yugoslavia, Libya and Afghanistan shows how far it is from the purposes set out in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. Its politico-military interventions that take place so far from the territories of its member states, with the aim of promoting regime change, are an objective that goes directly against the principle of the self-determination of peoples, and are incontrovertible empirical proof of the Alliance’s transformation into an aggressive and imperialist organisation.

NATO membership also implies subordination to US interests and guidelines. This applies not only to defence, but also to foreign policy and relations with the rest of the world. It is a colossal mistake to identify US interests with those of Europe. Membership of an organisation that is ultimately nothing more than a military bloc implies a militarised vision of the world that, in the face of conflict, prioritises militarised responses over other possibilities. It also implies the need for a continuous process of rearmament. In addition, it turns member states into military targets for potential adversaries of the United States.

On the other hand, it is important to note how energy security has stood out among the motivations of NATO and its members in the various missions in which they have participated. Its contribution to the climate crisis is as significant as its lack of transparency and accountability. NATO’s announced emission reduction plans are markedly greenwashing and its approach to climate change is eminently securitarian, avoiding any approach related to climate justice. The very existence of the Alliance contributes, in fact, to sustaining the colonial model of exploitation of the planet and dispossession of the majorities, which are the basis of the climate and environmental crisis.

The Alliance also acts as a key element in the diversion and return of migrants outside European borders and is far from being an instrument generating stability and security in complex contexts. The cases of Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan serve as an example.

The war in Ukraine highlights the need to re-establish a European peace movement aimed at recovering a common and shared security among all the peoples and nations of Europe. In this logic of an international architecture of peace and security, it is also necessary to limit, overcome and dissolve all military alliances and replace them with inclusive institutions of security and peace.

It is also essential to incorporate the feminist discourse, linked to collectivity, to a communit-centered approach, to the land, to the centrality of life and care. This is especially true when we are faced with the choice between continuing to sustain extractivist and environmentally destructive dynamics through armed violence, or simply degrow, destroy the systems of domination and survive.

This publication therefore advocates “No to war, no to NATO” as an amendment to the whole, to a militarism predatory of human lives and resources, of habitats, of economies. Peace is not just a trite slogan, but a policy of relations that must be deployed at all levels, from interpersonal to inter-state, now more than ever.
INTRODUCTION

To celebrate the 40th anniversary of Spain’s accession to the Atlantic Alliance, NATO is holding its meeting in Madrid in June 2022. Spain’s entry into NATO was no easy task. The referendum, which served to corroborate this entry, was saved with difficulty by a government that realised that a high percentage of its population preferred not to be part of a military organisation that would mean participating in the conflicts that were to come.

In this report, we propose to review and update the role that NATO has played and continues to play in global peace and security. It will be done from a security approach based on the culture of peace, feminism and other critical approaches that bring to military security analysis what it lacks: the approach to security not exclusively of states and their elites, but of ordinary people, of human security, as recommended by the United Nations.

For this purpose, we have opted for a report with short chapters that address current aspects of security and historical analyses of NATO’s role, related to its role and influence in the development of a war-mongering security that has done nothing but building a world with more war, greater militarisation and, therefore, greater insecurity. Ten researchers and activists, analysts and pacifist activists, members and collaborators of the Centre Delàs, have contributed to this report.

The historical vision is analysed by Pere Ortega in the first chapter, with a review of NATO’s role after the collapse of the USSR, at whose crossroads the military organisation chose a path that has determined subsequent conflicts. In the second contribution, Eduardo Melero adds on to the analysis with a critical legal view of NATO’s role in relation to international law. Next, Tica Font provides forecasts related to the possible novelties of NATO’s new Strategic Concept 2022. In the following chapter, Nora Millares provides a feminist reading of security and NATO. For their part, Teresa de Fortuny and Xavier Bohigas discuss in detail NATO’s enormous and threatening nuclear potential and its submission to the dangerous leadership of the United States. This is followed by two chapters that address issues related to a critical environmentalist approach in which,
firstly, Alejandro Pozo reviews NATO’s missions to promote the extraction and supply of fossil fuels for its member states and, secondly, Javier García Raboso takes a broad look at the Alliance’s (negative) contribution to climate change. José Luis Gordillo provides an analysis of NATO’s wars, demonstrating that they contradict the Alliance’s founding purposes and constitute the prelude to a new Cold War. Lastly, Ainhoa Ruiz tackles one of the most characteristic aspects of our times, showing how the militarisation of social or humanitarian problems, such as migration, provokes a militarised response.

To conclude, we include an alternative proposal from civil society, based on a culture of peace and human security: “Common Security 2022: For our shared future”. Written by experts from the International Peace Bureau and the Olof Palme Foundation and of which, thanks to the collaboration of Reiner Braun, a summary is attached. This proposal is even more relevant today, given the urgent need to design a security architecture that builds peace on the continent and truly avoids war in Europe.
1. NATO AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR
Pere Ortega

1.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The fall of the Berlin Wall heralded the end of the Cold War between the two major political and military blocs, led by the USSR and the United States, culminating in the demise of the USSR. This took place between 1989 and 1991, after which the republics under the Soviet orbit severed their ties with Russia, and the Warsaw Pact, the military alliance of which they were part, was dissolved in February 1991. It was in the midst of this process that, in November 1990, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in Paris, attended by all European countries without exception, along with the Central Asian republics that had been part of the USSR, as well as the USA and Canada. At this conference, the Charter for a New Europe was promulgated, generating great expectations and hopes, as it proposed a series of disarmament and cooperation measures for all the states gathered there. The aim of the conference was to articulate a new security structure for Europe, by means of mechanisms for preventing and supervising conflicts that might arise in the new political stage that was to come for Europe.

Among the first measures adopted, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which suggested substantial reductions in both the number of military personnel and some of the existing weapons arsenals among the signatory countries of the Treaty, took on special relevance. These were moments of hope. But it soon became clear that these hopes were short-lived. Shortly afterwards, in November 1991 in Rome, all NATO heads of state met to decide on the Alliance’s future. Despite the fact that the Warsaw Pact military organisation had already been dissolved and NATO therefore had no enemy, the assembled leaders, instead of dissolving NATO themselves, decided to maintain its continuity as a hegemonic military bloc serving their interests. It was at this meeting that a Strategic Concept was agreed, outlining the outlines of the new NATO and introducing major changes to its structure.

Thus, a new model of armed forces was defined, making them more versatile, smaller, more flexible, more professional, better armed and capable of deploying immediate responses to new threats. This new NATO considered the dangers and challenges as multifaceted and multidirectional, although without specifying them. Moreover, it introduced the observation of
acting at the request of international bodies such as the UN and the CSCE, which could be interpreted in a double sense: acting under the umbrella of a UN or CSCE resolution, or, on the contrary, acting without their coverage and doing so independently according to one’s own interests.

These were the guidelines for subsequent NATO summits, at which new challenges were to be defined. It was at the December 1994 Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels that the identification of the USSR as the main threat was replaced by new challenges. These could come from different places, but their nature was not specifically defined, hence the term “multifaceted”. At the same time, these challenges could be multidirectional i.e. the possibility was opened up to act in the pacification of conflicts that required it. This was reaffirmed at the subsequent Paris–Madrid Summit in 1997, and finally signed at the 50th anniversary celebration of NATO’s creation in Washington in April 1999. At this event, the new Strategic Concept was adopted with the mission of safeguarding Western security and strategic interests against any danger threatening the Western political and economic model. NATO also delegitimised the CSCE, which had become the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994, as a security organisation relegated to second place. This, in turn, definitively buried the hopes pinned on the 1990 Charter of Paris for a Europe with common and shared security.

The 1999 Washington Treaty enthroned this new NATO, introducing substantial changes in its programmatic objectives, ceasing to be a defensive organisation to take on new missions, challenges and objectives: act outside the traditional North Atlantic area of coverage; act against the instability caused by conflicts anywhere that affect its interests; act against ungovernability in Russia and the countries of the former socialist bloc; prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in new countries; confront international terrorism; and confront the fight against organised crime.

NATO thus became responsible for maintaining security in a vague Euro–Atlantic area “recognising that Alliance forces may be obliged to operate beyond the borders of the North Atlantic”. This was unequivocally endorsed at the November 2010 meeting in Lisbon, where the heads of state who met there gave the definitive backing to this new NATO as a result of the updating of the 1999 Strategic Concept. A NATO that re-emerged to halt the consolidation of other collective security systems, such as the OSCE for the Eurasian area, or the UN as the guarantor of global security. At the same time, it destroyed all hopes for the birth of a Europe based on cooperation and common and shared security with Russia.

1.2 NATO’S DANGEROUS EXPANSION

It was in the midst of that triumphantalist euphoria following the defeat of the USSR, which Francis Fukuyama called the end of history, that the so-called Liberal Peace was imposed by the victors, who, with the US at the head, imposed that peace on the countries of Soviet influence. In economic terms, this peace was neoliberal, aimed at reducing state intervention to a minimum, imposing market liberalisation and reducing trade regulation, and, in political terms, formal democracy.

It was in this context that the various NATO summits of the 1990s took place. Specifically, at the aforementioned joint Paris–Madrid summit in 1997, the first step was taken by inviting three former Soviet republics - Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic - to join the Alliance. In 1999, two years later, they were admitted. At subsequent summits, more and more former Soviet republics joined: in 2002, in Prague, the three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were invited; and four Central European republics: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined definitively in 2004. After further negotiations in 2009, Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and finally, North Macedonia joined in 2020.

NATO’s enlargement and extension to Russia’s borders was opposed by Russia. Opposition that was scorned and ignored. Russia was extremely weak in those years. Such expansion was opposed by a number of international relations analysts, including some of the hawkish hardliners in the White House during the Cold War. In this vein, Thomas Friedman and George Kennan warned that a grave mistake would be made by incorporating former Soviet republics, as “such a decision would inflame nationalist, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russia” that could trigger serious conflicts in the future.

Warnings that fell on deaf ears. As was also the case with the verbal agreements reached in the negotiations between 1989 and 1991 between George Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Negotiations that, for example, agreed on the reunification of the two Germanys and the subsequent NATO membership of the resulting country. At the same time, Gorbachev was promised that the Alliance would not move “an inch to the East”. This promise was never fulfilled. The sweeping thrust of neoliberalism expanded unchecked, dismantling and demanding the privatisation of all structures in the countries of the so-called socialist system. Russia watched, unable to react.

The incorporation of former Soviet republics also provided an opportunity for arms manufacturers to
gain access to a new and hugely lucrative market. By being admitted to the Alliance, these republics became potential new customers for Western military industries, as they would be required to purchase new military equipment to make it compatible with that of the armed forces of NATO’s Western European member states.

This expansion of NATO towards Russia’s borders was accompanied by other issues of equal or greater importance, such as the US breaking with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) signed with the USSR in 2002. This treaty limited the installation of missiles and anti-missiles in Europe, with the mission of guaranteeing mutual destruction which, despite being a terrifying definition, had fulfilled a deterrent function. The consequence of this breach was that, in 2015, the US set up an anti-missile shield made up of spy satellites and radars to detect a missile attack from Russia.

### 1.3 Vladimir Putin’s Reaction

The collapse of the Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War greatly weakened the Kremlin. It was not until ten years later, in 1999, that an unknown KGB officer, who had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel, Vladimir Putin, was unexpectedly chosen by President Boris Yeltsin as prime minister. Following Yeltsin’s resignation a year later, the prime minister would be proclaimed Russia’s president. During that decade, Russia suffered the dispossession of most of its state property, which was divided between various high-ranking officials (later called oligarchs) and Russian organised crime mafias. Putin, with a skill worthy of a member of the KGB, relied on both to regain Russia’s economic pulse, in large part thanks to Russia’s enormous hydrocarbon reserves and rising prices that have significantly boosted Russia’s GDP.

If we add to the economic recovery the markedly nationalist policy dictated by Vladimir Putin, imbued with Pan-Slavic rhetoric and a return to heroic signs, there is a longing to recover the greatness of Russia and a desire to turn it back into a great political and military power.

A recovery of the great Russia in which Putin includes the nearly twenty-five million Russians who were left outside Russia’s borders after the demise of the USSR. Most of them are scattered among the neighbouring republics and have been the cause of various conflicts, some of them armed, since 1990. NATO’s approach to Russia’s borders not only unsettled the Kremlin, but also those pro-Russian populations who were fearful of being outside Russia’s orbit. This was the case in the territory of Transnistria in 1992 in Moldova, since then independent but not internationally recognised state. Or similarly, in the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus or Crimea, and the Donbas in Ukraine.

The Georgian case was a warning of how Putin’s Kremlin would relate to the aggravation of pro-Russian populations. This republic declared independence in 1991 after the demise of the USSR, and claimed the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as its own. Both territories rejected the claim and, after referendums, became de facto independent states. In 2003, Georgia witnessed the Rose Revolution, a peaceful uprising that overthrew a pro-Russian government and replaced it with a pro-Western one led by Saakashvili. As early as 2004, this president requested Georgia’s entry into NATO, and four years later, in 2008, he decided to militarily recover South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia intervened in favour of the independence of the two territories and, within five days, defeated and expelled the Georgian army from those territories. Since then, the two territories have been administered as independent but unrecognised states. Following that war, Georgia’s NATO membership was stalled, as Russia demanded.

Something similar to what happened in Georgia was repeated in Ukraine. Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has seen a succession of pro-Russian and pro-Western governments, which have led to clashes between those in favour of integration into Western Europe and those who wished to remain under Russia’s protection. Ukraine has 8.5 million people of Russian origin (17.5% of the total population) living mainly in the east and south of the country along the Russian borders. In 1997 a pro-Western government applied for NATO membership, which was immediately opposed by Russia. After a few years of tension, in 2013, a government that emerged from the ballot box refused to join the European Union and NATO, as agreed by the previous government. An attitude that provoked massive protests, leading to the Euromaidan revolt, a revolution that overthrew the pro-Russian Yanukovych government. This political change triggered the revolt in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the Donbas, and in the Crimean Peninsula, territories with a Russian majority population. The first two were militarily supported by Russia, and Crimea was occupied by Russian forces and immediately annexed to Russia. It is true that the annexation was contrary to international law, but it should be remembered that in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev had decided to “give” Crimea to Ukraine, without thinking that one day the USSR might disintegrate and Ukraine would become an independent republic. A peninsula on which Russia keeps the Russian navy anchored in the port of Sevastopol, from where it has access to the Mediterranean. It would be naive to believe that Russia would abandon Crimea with its vital geostrategic importance.
After the EuroMaidan revolution of 2014, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that Ukraine’s demand for NATO membership could open a serious conflict with Russia. A premonition that, since 22 February 2022, has become the worst conflict in Europe since the Second World War, and which highlights the irresponsible policy of NATO member governments on how to manage security in Europe.

1.4 CONCLUSION

Europe is at a crossroads following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which undoubtedly deserves total condemnation for violating the sovereignty of a state protected by international law and the United Nations. However, this does not absolve NATO of responsibility for the contempt shown towards Russia, following its demand that Ukraine does not join NATO, given the threat it posed to Russian security. In this sense, it must be admitted that NATO’s continued existence only serves the United States’ goal of maintaining its hegemonic power in control of the world’s economy, and thus to use force to break down, when necessary, the resistance of other competing states. In today’s global geopolitics, this is particularly represented by China and the political/economic axis that was taking shape in its alliance with Russia in the Shanghai agreements. War in Ukraine weakens that treaty, as Russia will inevitably be deteriorated, both politically and economically, while the United States will emerge stronger against Russia, China and also against its European partners, which have once again played a subordinate role, if not of puppetry, to the US.

That is why it is necessary to relaunch the European peace movement which, somewhat innocently, demobilised after the end of the Cold War. It believed that reconciliation and peace would usher in a new era of common security among all the nations of Europe. It has not been the case and now the war in Ukraine highlights the need to rebuild a European peace movement that aims to restore a common and shared security among all the peoples and nations of Europe. A goal that makes peace possible through reconciliation with Russia.
2. NATO AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEMOCRACY

Eduardo Melero Alonso

2.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most important decisions to be taken at the NATO summit in Madrid (29–30 June 2022) is the adoption of a new Strategic Concept. The Strategic Concept is the Alliance’s second most important document, after the North Atlantic Treaty, on which NATO was founded. It sets out broad policy guidelines for Alliance’s action.

In what follows I will focus on four issues that were already raised in the 1999 and 2010 Strategic Concepts and will almost certainly be present in the one to be adopted in 2022. These issues are: (1) a broad conception of defence, (2) the attempt to relax adherence to the UN Charter in what has been termed the “legal deregulation of war”, (3) the extension of NATO’s geographical scope of action beyond the North Atlantic Treaty and (4) the democratic deficit in the adoption of the Strategic Concept that can be observed internally.

The analysis will focus on the content of the 2010 Strategic Concept. Although it is about to expire, I believe that it serves to highlight how the four issues mentioned above are realised. Nor do I believe that the new Strategic Concept to be adopted in 2022 will imply a profound change in the trend of the last twenty years since the 1999 Strategic Concept.

2.2 NATO ON PAPER: THE CONTENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949, contains various provisions: the obligation for member states to settle their international conflicts by peaceful means and to refrain from resorting to force or the threat of force in their international relations (Article 1), the pursuit of economic cooperation (Article 2), and the obligation not to enter into international commitments that contradict the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 8).

There are three main commitments that NATO member states undertake. The obligation to maintain and enhance individual and collective capabilities to resist armed attack (Article 3). The obligation to initiate consultations in the event of a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the parties (Article 4). Finally, the obligation to assist individually and collectively a Member State that suffers an armed attack in Europe or North America, in exercise of the right of self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty). Based on this obligation, the North Atlantic Treaty can be understood as a mutual
defence treaty through which the right of self-defence is articulated.

On paper, according to the literal content of the Treaty, NATO is set up as a defensive alliance. In practice, NATO is acting beyond the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty. This issue was highlighted in NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept and is present in the latest Strategic Concept adopted in 2010. The Strategic Concept to be adopted at the Madrid summit will certainly also go beyond what is set out in the North Atlantic Treaty.

2.3 ANALYSIS OF THE 2010 STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The Strategic Concept is a political document, approved by the heads of state and government of NATO member states. It has no legal value, is not an international treaty and therefore cannot change the content of the North Atlantic Treaty. The problem is that, at least since 1999, the content of the Strategic Concept goes beyond the regulations of the North Atlantic Treaty and raises questions about NATO’s full compliance with the UN Charter.

The current Strategic Concept was adopted in 2010 at the NATO’s summit in Lisbon. It is entitled “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” and is a document of just eleven pages and thirty-eight paragraphs. As a result, the issues raised are not developed in any detail. Moreover, the language used is rather ambiguous, so that its content can be interpreted in more than one way.

2.3.1 A BROAD CONCEPTION OF DEFENCE

In the traditional conception, defence means protecting the population, territory and sovereignty of states against attack from other countries. This conception is present in paragraph 16 of the Strategic Concept: “The Alliance’s primary responsibility is to protect and defend our territory and populations against attack, as specified in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty”.

While recognising that the threat level of a conventional attack on NATO territory is low (paragraph 7), the Strategic Concept refers to “new threats” against which NATO must defend itself. These new threats are the acquisition of modern military capabilities by other countries, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles (paragraph 8), the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (paragraph 9), terrorism (paragraph 10), instability or conflicts beyond NATO’s borders, including the promotion of extremism, terrorism and transnational illegal activities, such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people (paragraph 11), cyber-attacks (paragraph 12), securing vital communications and transport routes, including energy supply (paragraph 13), technological development, including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space (paragraph 14), and environmental constraints and resource limitations, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and growing energy needs (paragraph 15).

This greatly expands NATO’s potential scope for action. The Strategic Concept states that “NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means” (paragraph 1). Although new threats are of varying degrees of relevance to the security of NATO countries, the Strategic Concept thus leaves open the possibility of addressing any new threat through military intervention. As clearly stated in paragraph 19: “We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the security of our populations”. It is thus clear that any threat can lead to a military response by NATO.

2.3.2 THE LEGAL DEREGLATION OF WAR

NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept appears to be in line with what José Luis Gordillo has described as the “legal deregulation of war”. This deregulation consists of a very flexible interpretation, even violation, of the UN Charter’s requirements for the use of armed force in international relations.

The UN Charter prohibits states from employing the threat or use of armed force (Article 2.4). There are only two exceptions: individual or collective self-defence (regulated in Article 51 of the Charter) and the possibility for the UN Security Council to adopt measures authorising the use of force on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Strategic Concept states that “The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the Washington Treaty, which affirm the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security” (paragraph 2). It also states that, in ensuring its security, NATO will “always act in accordance with international law” (paragraph 4).

Despite this, there are also elements that relativize NATO’s full submission to the UN Charter. In section 4.a), which refers to collective defence, it is expressly stated that “NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges when they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole”.

NATO, BUILDING GLOBAL INSECURITY
This appears to be a very broad and flexible interpretation of the requirements for the exercise of self-defence in the UN Charter. Self-defence is exercised in response to an armed attack and this response must be immediate, proportional to the attack, necessary and provisional. However, according to the Strategic Concept, NATO could intervene militarily not only in the face of armed attack, but also in the face of any threat of aggression, and even more diffuse, emerging security challenges.

The Strategic Concept could thus be used to try to justify preventive self-defence. Pre-emptive self-defence is not exercised in the face of an armed attack, but in the face of the threat of attack according to the subjective assessment of the state seeking to exercise self-defence. Preventive self-defence is contrary to the UN Charter. However, there are governments, such as the United States and Israel, that consider it to be justified.

And not only that: defence against any threat of aggression and emerging security challenges could in practice involve military interventions to secure energy supplies or to ensure the opening of vital communications and transport routes. Such military interventions would violate the prohibition on the use of force in international relations set out in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter.

### 2.3.3 Expansion of the Geographical Scope of Action

According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s geographical scope of action in the exercise of the right of self-defence is limited to Europe and North America. By contrast, the Strategic Concept sets no geographical limit to NATO’s action, which could intervene anywhere on the planet. It is worth recalling here the intervention in Afghanistan. An intervention that was clearly outside the Alliance’s sphere of action, which the 1999 Strategic Concept sought to justify: a Strategic Concept that did not set any geographical limit to NATO’s action either.

Evidence of this unlimited expansion of the Alliance’s scope of action can be found in paragraph 20 of the 2010 Strategic Concept: ‘Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and people. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction’.

In the same vein, it states that collective defence and crisis response operations may be conducted at a “strategic distance”; and reference is also made to “expeditionary operations” (paragraph 19). Again, the absence of geographical limits to NATO’s action in this paragraph, which explicitly recognises that military interventions could be carried out anywhere in the world, is noteworthy.

### 2.3.4 NATO’s Undemocratic Approach to the Adoption of the Strategic Concept

As has been argued, NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept has in practice changed the literal wording of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is something that a political document cannot do, as it lacks the necessary legal standing to amend an international treaty. The Strategic Concept maintains a broad concept of security, seeks to legitimise military operations that would violate the UN Charter and extends NATO’s potential geographic scope of action to the entire planet. The content of the Strategic Concept violates both the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty.

All this has been done without any real democratic debate on the defence policy implications of the 2010 Strategic Concept. In Spain, there was not even a debate in the Cortes Generales before the Spanish government approved the Strategic Concept at the Lisbon NATO summit.

The absence of a genuine democratic debate on NATO’s Strategic Concept not only highlights the low quality of our democracy in relation to defence policy. In this case, moreover, parliamentary debate was mandatory, since the Strategic Concept, although a political document, modifies in practice the content of the North Atlantic Treaty. According to Article 94 of the Spanish Constitution, the conclusion or modification of an international treaty or convention of a military nature requires the prior authorisation of the Cortes Generales. Therefore, a procedure for the revision of the North Atlantic Treaty should have been formally opened.

The procedure for approving NATO’s Strategic Concept highlights the “de-democratisation” of defence policy. Membership of this organisation, which aims to intervene militarily anywhere in the world, to defend itself against any threat, not only requires breaching international law when necessary. It also requires bypassing the basic rules of our parliamentary democracy.

### 2.4 Conclusion

In my view, it is very likely that the new NATO Strategic Concept to be adopted at the Madrid Summit will be along similar lines to the 2010 Strategic Concept. There would be no radical changes, but rather an evolution of NATO’s development over the past twenty years.
As for threats, the 2010 Strategic Concept defined them so broadly that it is very difficult for anything significantly new to emerge. More emphasis is likely to be placed on nuclear deterrence. Reference will be made to ‘hybrid threats’, in which military and non-military elements are present simultaneously, including economic measures, cyber-attacks, disinformation or interference in elections. More emphasis is likely to be placed on climate change. There will also be explicit reference to the relationship with China, which has been described by the North Atlantic Council as a ‘systemic challenge’. And there will be a strong focus on Russia as a new threat in the wake of the war with Ukraine. All of this will be based on the idea that not only will NATO respond to armed attacks, but also that NATO could intervene militarily in the face of any threat to its security.

I also believe that ambiguity will remain regarding NATO’s submission to the UN Charter. The Charter will be mentioned, but the possibility will be left open for military interventions for legitimate preventive self-defence and to secure the supply of essential natural resources and to ensure the opening of major communications and transport routes. In the same vein, it may be intended to include cyber-attacks under the umbrella of the right to self-defence; however, as they are not an armed attack, this would be contrary to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 51 of the UN Charter. Nor do I doubt that no geographical restrictions will be placed on NATO’s military sphere of action, even though this is in clear contradiction to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.

All this will be done outside the parliaments of NATO member states. Without opening a democratic debate on what NATO’s role in the international security system should be.
3. APPROACHING THE NEW NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Tica Font

3.1 INTRODUCTION

What we call the Strategic Concept, which is not a strategy, sets out general political guidelines, based on an analysis of the current geopolitical situation that should serve to guide investments in developing and acquiring military capabilities and carrying out transformations over the next ten years in the organisation itself, as well as in the member countries. The Strategic Concept must therefore provide clear political guidelines that articulate responses. For example, in 2014 Russia annexed Crimea, four years after having approved the last Strategic Concept, and the latter did not have a response foreseen for this situation.

The 2010 Strategic Concept defined the Alliance’s three main missions: collective defence, crisis management and shared security. The new Strategic Concept may emphasise a new aspect: resilience. For an eminently descriptive analysis of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, documents from leading defence think tanks, the Real Instituto Elcano,¹ (which is the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies)² and a group of think tanks in the Transatlantic Leadership Network³ have been used.

3.2 GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL OVERVIEW

Members’ reflections on defining the new Strategic Concept should be based on an analysis, in geopolitical and military terms, of the events of recent years: the war in Syria, the exit from Afghanistan, Russia’s invasion/annexation of Crimea, the war in Ukraine, the political differences between the United States and Europe on the role of NATO, Brexit and the emergence of new disruptive technologies, especially Artificial Intelligence.

1. (Simon L y Arteaga F. (2021), La OTAN se actualiza: El Concepto Estratégico de Madrid, available on: https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-otan-se-actualiza-el-concepto-estrategico-de-madrid/
3. The future of NATO in the age of disruption. Available at: https://www.transatlantic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NATO-TF-SC-final-feb-16-2022.pdf This text has been prepared by a group of analysts from international think tanks integrated in the TransatlanticLeadership Network (TLN), and outlines the broad outlines of the new Strategic Concept that the Alliance will approve in Madrid and which will revise the 2010 Lisbon agreement.
The new Strategic Concept, in the current context of war in Ukraine, is likely to insist on strengthening the link between Europe and the United States, thus not closing NATO or Europe’s strategic independence from the United States. This link will accept a certain degree of strategic autonomy for Europe in order to carry out its own military actions. It will also see to what extent Europe will have technological and military industrial autonomy within the Alliance, and will make this compatible with US interests in the Pacific. It is to be expected that Europe’s autonomy from NATO, if it exists at all, will not be substantial.

It will update the concept of deterrence to the new situation, especially by strengthening deterrence with Russia. It is to be expected that the concept of deterrence will be tougher, more forceful and proactive, not reactive, but responsive and likely to include military responses in all areas - land, sea, air, cyberspace and space - and in both conventional and non-conventional forms (so-called hybrid warfare). This will be conditional on all Alliance members agreeing to military approaches.

It will define new threats, adversaries and will address NATO’s role in the competition for hegemony between China and the United States. This will be decisive. The choice will be whether Europeans join the United States in its confrontation with China or maintain a differentiated strategy of their own. Depending on the strategic response to China, NATO will be strengthened or weakened.

After 30 years of global hegemony by the United States and the West in general, the new scenario will present Russia as an adversary. We don’t know if China will be classified as an adversary or as a “systemic challenge” i.e. Russia will be considered a military threat to the Alliance, but possibly China will not be considered or defined as a military threat, but simply as a competitor.

China has laid out for a long time already that the US is a “declining” power that wants to prevent China’s rise on the global stage so as not to lose its position as the world’s leading power. Plus, it argues they represent the “emergence”, meaning that democracy is in decline and autocracies are on the rise. China and Russia are two powers with autocratic political regimes, which leads one to consider that the new Strategic Concept will address a narrative of exalting Western liberal values against the Asian ones that China represents and, therefore, the value of NATO as a guarantee of Western values of democracy, freedom and human rights.

3.3 TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADING OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES

We are in what is called an era of disruptive technologies, i.e. technologies that make existing technologies obsolete. America’s strategic culture is based on achieving technological superiority over its adversaries; its superiority since the mid-20th century has been based on atomic technology, information technology and precision weapons technology. Now, they have the perception that the technological superiority they have shown so far is in danger and that the new technologies, especially Artificial Intelligence, on which their superiority is based, are within the reach of other actors or will be in a short time. They fear China will surpass the United States in technological terms.

In 2014, the United States launched the so-called “Defence Innovation Initiative” and “Third Offset Strategy”, the purpose of which is to maintain technological disruption that allows them to keep their military superiority over any adversary, so we can say that a new arms race has begun. The technological priorities, remembering that we are at the beginning of this new era, are related to robotics, autonomous vehicles, directed-energy weapons and submarine warfare. All Allies share the idea that we are in a new era of disruptive technologies, and all are committed to invest in the development of new capabilities in the military field and support military industry in their development. They also agree on the fact that NATO must maintain its technological edge over potential adversaries or competitors, especially if they are concerned about Chinese developments. It may be feasible for the new Strategic Concept to consider the creation of a financial fund to accelerate innovation in these technologies.

The divergences or disagreements between Europe and the US may arise in industrial cooperation. The EU has made a major commitment to developing its own defence strategy, independent of that of the United States, and to promoting the development of its military industry within the framework of PESCO. However, this European drive could jeopardise the hegemony of the US arms market. Washington looks askance at Europe’s industrial commitment, and has already managed to get its military industry to participate in European industrial projects funded by the EU through PESCO.

3.4 COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

It is represented by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in which, if one member state is attacked, the others will defend it; a defence that is based on a clear
willingness to use military and non-military means and to use these means in a coordinated manner. In short, it represents the doctrine of deterrence in a credible manner.

Since the end of the Cold War, and given that there was no common adversary or enemy, this mission was relegated to the background. The new Strategic Concept is supposed to put collective defence back in the foreground and will have to define the capabilities that NATO needs to have in order to be able to deter adversaries. Deterrence will remain a key element in this new Strategic Concept.

In the previous Strategic Concept, deterrence was based on three capabilities: nuclear capabilities, conventional capabilities and anti-missile systems. The new Strategic Concept will rework and redefine the capabilities needed in the new geopolitical landscape. Nuclear deterrence will become more important in view of new Russian investments in short-range and intermediate-range dual-use missiles, the hypersonic missile, and in view of Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine. NATO can therefore be expected to contemplate the nuclear threat, a threat that must be credible and therefore feasible to use. Some initiatives have already been taken in this regard, such as increasing the service life of certain nuclear projectiles or adapting them to new fighter aircrafts.

It is also expected to set guidelines for investments in the development of conventional capabilities that facilitate the use of nuclear weapons, such as the suppression of air defences or long-range actions. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept will contemplate modernisations of nuclear capabilities, new formats, the introduction of Artificial Intelligence in them and updates of conventional capabilities to support the use of nuclear weapons, and will have to establish mechanisms for consultation among the Member States. It will also increase the resilience of these capabilities in terms of infrastructures, cyber-attacks and military command.

The new Strategic Concept is likely to incorporate the dominance of outer space and thus the development of weapons located in outer space and cyberspace. This will require the development of new capabilities that did not exist in 2010.

If we anticipate that the new conflicts are hybrid or “grey zone” wars, resilience will gain prominence in deterrence, especially when threats are expected to be directed against civilian targets and critical infrastructure. The aim will be to show the adversary that social, psychological, cyber or space structures can withstand threats; to deter the adversary from carrying out a political disinformation campaign, but to prepare resilient capabilities so that the adversary cannot achieve its objectives. This will require a great deal of coordination among member states and legislative harmonisation.

If in the new Strategic Concept, the idea that conflicts are hybrid or grey zone wars gains weight, if it is proposed that responses to conflicts are sufficient with military responses and resilience plans are developed, it may be that this Strategic Concept modifies article 5 to adapt it to these new scenarios and can be invoked in the event of an unarmed attack.

3.5 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND SHARED SECURITY

These are called international, humanitarian or peacekeeping missions. In recent decades, NATO, in countries such as Iraq, has focused on missions to train and educate Iraqi military forces, or to advise the Ministry of Defence. In countries such as Afghanistan, NATO’s missions evolved from security support, training and combat with the Afghan Armed Forces to a reconstruction operation for which NATO was not prepared. The failure of operations in Afghanistan or Libya brings these crisis management operations into disrepute.

This type of mission is likely to continue, but with less relevance. Some members argue that countries such as Russia and China have invested in war-oriented capabilities over the decades, while NATO has been trapped in Iraq or Afghanistan.

On the other hand, shared security is addressed through engagement with third countries under the NATO banner. There are global risks such as climate change, terrorism, pandemic, arms control or transnational crime that may be worth addressing with other countries, whether or not they are adversaries or other regional partnerships. They will certainly address and give prominence to the climate change-security nexus.

3.6 CONCLUSIONS

The Strategic Concept will emphasise reinforcement, deterrence and defence, which is tantamount to enhancing all military capabilities, whether nuclear, conventional or cyber. NATO is preparing for military confrontation, to respond to or anticipate threats or actions by state or non-state actors in any region of the world.

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4. Within the actions that can be carried out in conflict, the “grey zone” is dominated by actions that do not cross the threshold of attack or armed response.
It will be very relevant and will carry a lot of weight in its bid to maintain a technological advantage over China and Russia. The starting point is the idea that NATO cannot take for granted that it has a technological advantage over China, based on the premise that China intends to become the world’s leading AI power in the coming years. This should include a push for transatlantic cooperation in critical technologies, extending to academia and private industries.

I would say that Russia, because of what is happening with the war in Ukraine, is not seen as capable of maintaining a pulse with the NATO world, so they will approach it in terms of managing it, so geographically they will talk about the importance of the Eastern Flank. China is another matter; it will have to be lived with as a world power, and it must be assumed that they are very active in security matters and are necessary in global affairs. Consequently, they will seek to strike a dynamic balance with China.

The war in Ukraine and the Russian threat to Europe will lead to an increase in the US military presence in Eastern European countries, especially in the Baltic states, with sufficient forces to act or “repel” any Russian aggression, while military cooperation with Sweden, Finland, which do not belong to NATO, and other countries bordering Russia will certainly be strengthened.

The new Strategic Concept will propose a paradigm shift to global competition between great powers, especially China and the United States. Yet, the truth is that this paradigm shift does not represent a profound change, in reality it does not change anything, it simply adapts to a new context, but global relations and relations between powers will continue to be one of competition, imposition, domination, aggressiveness, instability or force. The significant change would have to be to change the relations between countries and powers to relations of respect, acceptance, collaboration, cooperation or sharing of the planet.
4. FROM FEMINISM, FOR LIFE AND AGAINST NATO
Nora Miralles Crespo

4.1 INTRODUCTION

More than a thousand women from twelve countries met in The Hague in April 1915 with a two-point agenda: women’s suffrage and the demand that international disputes must be settled peacefully and diplomatically. In this way, the women gathered, in direct opposition to the very existence of armed confrontation, were distancing themselves from the dominant trend at the governmental peace conferences of the time, which revolved around the “humanisation” of war. Less than 200 kilometres away, hundreds of soldiers were dying on the front lines of the First World War, inhaling gases used as novel chemical weapons.

The Hague Conference is considered the starting point of the women’s peace movement, a background without which the involvement and role of antimilitarist feminism in the movements opposing NATO and its expansion cannot be understood. Practically, since the creation of the organisation, but especially at the end of the Cold War, organisations such as the North American CODEPINK, the Women in Black Against Wars or the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) have denounced on different occasions - usually coinciding with NATO summits or military interventions in conflicts such as the Balkans or Libya - not only the concrete actions of the Alliance, but its very existence and what it represents. In 2009, forty women from feminist antimilitarist organisations met on the occasion of the NATO summit in Strasbourg to address the patriarchal logic that underlies the organisation’s language and the daily impacts on the daily lives of women living near NATO bases and installations around the world.5

In recent months, the occupation of Ukraine by the Russian army - which Putin’s government justifies by the Alliance’s expansionism in Eastern Europe - has reignited the clamour of women’s organisations and collectives, especially in Western countries, against NATO. In Spain, Catalonia and the Basque Country, women’s groups and anti-militarist feminists are leading protests against the war, just as they took part in the mobilisations against Spain’s entry into NATO in the early and mid-1980s. Mobilisations that travelled through the main cities of Spain, under a key slogan that makes explicit the profound relationship between the violence of armed conflicts and the violence that we experience daily against our bodies under the patriarchal system: “Neither a war which kills us, nor a peace which oppresses us”.

This continuity between structural violence and the violence of wars, known as the continuum of violence, forms the background to the genealogy of feminist opposition to NATO as the guardian structure of a particular geopolitical order. This structure privileges military power, colonialism and the pre-eminence of the West, especially the United States, over multilateralism, diplomatic channels and peaceful relations between states. The connection and the relationship of mutual dependence between war and the patriarchal system, extensively exposed by authors such as Cynthia Enloe, Cynthia Cockburn and Carol Cohn, have conveyed the historical relationship of feminisms with antimilitarism. This has taken the form of denouncing the specific impacts that women suffer in contexts of conflict and the need to recognise their contributions to the achievement of peace. Thus, one of the historical struggles of the international women's movement was the demand for a Women, Peace and Security Agenda in supranational governance organisations, which would allow these issues to be put on the table. The irritation of the demands of international feminism into the highest governing body of the United Nations, the Security Council, reached its zenith with the approval of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in October 2000.

The law known as 1325 was a historic milestone in the visibility of the violence that women experience in the context of conflict, as well as in the recognition of women's agency and the diversity of roles they play. It also highlighted the urgency and the need to open up spaces for participation at all levels of decision-making in peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction, including conflict prevention, conflict resolution and transitional justice processes. At the same time, it meant the entry of feminist postulates into the most masculinised and powerful body of world governance. But the satisfaction of many of its promoters was short-lived. During the following years, the Security Council approved another nine resolutions linked to the first one, most of which offered an attempt to concretise the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, which reduced the initial will of 1325 to a liberal and decaffeinated response to the “neither a war which kills us, nor a peace which oppresses us”. The body of some of these resolutions, such as 1820 (2008) and 2667 (2019), contained a certain way of understanding the pillars of prevention, protection and participation that underpinned 1325, adopting as a banner the protection of women from gender-based violence in conflict contexts and, in particular, from the so-called “rape as a weapon of war”. Others made clear the desire to incorporate more women into the ranks of armies, security forces and peacekeeping missions. A comfortably pragmatic vision that, for many gender and security scholars, feminist anti-militarist activists and local women’s organisations, did not - and does not - confront gender stereotypes and prevailing militarism, and which NATO was quick to embrace.

4.2 NATO’S INSTRUMENTALISATION OF GENDER AND FEMINIST DISCOURSE

In the 1970s and 1980s, coinciding with the rise and institutionalisation of a certain white liberal egalitarian feminism, which sought to increase gender representation and equality in all social and economic spheres, regardless of its close links to the patriarchal system, women began to join national armies. A movement also facilitated by the shift in focus of post-Cold War militarism, which adopted new languages and expanded the role of the armed forces with “humanitarian” and peacekeeping operations and required new corps, profiles, skills and expertise. “Only an organisation that truly respects the diversity of backgrounds and experience of its members can operate effectively in a complex security environment”, NATO proclaimed as early as 1976, publicly stating, through its Military Committee, the need to integrate a gender perspective into the Alliance. This took the form of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF), whose mission was to promote the efficient use of the capabilities of women in NATO’s armed forces and to provide guidance on gender and diversity issues.

The real push for the instrumental adoption of gender mainstreaming within NATO came with the adoption of 1325, which NATO welcomed, and it established an informal group to study its deployment within the organisation. In 2008, NATO’s Strategic Command was tasked with providing guidelines for the implementation of the resolution and approved bi-strategic command guidelines for integrating the Women, Peace and Security Agenda into NATO’s military missions and operations. Soon, the Office of Gender Mainstreaming was established within the International Military Staff (IMS), an advisory body supporting the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest governing body.

In the name of gender mainstreaming, NATO has promoted the incorporation and increase in the proportion of women in NATO deployed forces and in the armies of member states, despite the fact that UN Security Council Resolution 1325 does not call for more women in armies, but rather calls - in rather concise terms - for expanding “the role and contribution of women in United Nations field operations and especially among military observers, civilian police, humanitarian and human rights personnel”.

In turn, the adoption of 1325 has also taken shape in the operations in which the Alliance is engaged and which it loudly advertises. The case of Afghanistan is notorious, where NATO boasted that it had gone “from being...
an organisation that talked about how to implement 1325 to being an organisation that applied it in practice”, working with women in the communities and training them to become part of the Afghan security forces. Meanwhile, historical women’s organisations in the country, such as RAWA, denounced the impacts of the military invasion, the US bombings and the violations of women’s rights committed under the NATO-backed administration. This co-optation was also bitterly denounced by the promoters of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, such as the activist and academic Cynthia Cockburn, an indisputable reference point in the field of security from a feminist and pacifist point of view. “How can those of us who oppose NATO and deplore its very existence and its war in Afghanistan welcome its adherence to ‘our’ Resolution 1325? Especially when this war was justified on the grounds of liberating Afghan women from fundamentalist oppression,” lamented Cockburn at the turn of the century.

4.3 THE URGENCY OF REDEFINING SECURITY

The divergences and criticisms of the militarist co-optation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and, ultimately, of the feminist discourse at the service of organisations such as NATO, refer to the basic debate that was intended to be conducted within the Security Council on the urgency of putting an end to wars. An anti-militarist vocation that was softened in the process of approving 1325, adapting more to the dominant language and practices, and which made it easier for the resolution to be absorbed by organisations that were exponents of warmongering. That condemned it to be what the women gathered in The Hague rejected, not a way to end conflicts, but to humanise them. “It was our success, our project. And yet, the more we push for its implementation, the more we clearly see its limitations. Even worse, we see it being used by those who are directly opposed to what we intended,” Cynthia Cockburn wrote in a 2011 article.

At the same time, the contradictions generated by NATO’s adoption of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda are linked to another of the objectives of its promoters: to redefine security, with the urgency of transforming hegemonic notions of security that had and still have material implications for the lives of women living in conflict and post-conflict contexts, but also for theoretical peace. A redefinition of security that did not find space, coinciding in time with the shift towards state-centred and traditional cosmovisions of security, the so-called military national security, which began in 2001 and which ended the attempt to open up the definition of security in international governance bodies.

All of this provided fertile ground for the armouring of the militarist and traditional vision in the deployment of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, which is clearly condensed in the speech with which former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen celebrated the first decade of the resolution in 2010. Rasmussen defined addressing the specific dangers women face in armed conflict as “a crucial component of the security challenges of the 21st century”.

4.4 DEMILITARISE, DECREASE, SURVIVE: A CONCLUSION

The securitisation of feminist discourse, which in practice takes the form of the subordination of 1325 to the security agenda of states, through deeply militaristic National Action Plans, or the instrumentalisation of women and gender in the fight against terrorism, makes a movement closely linked to collectivity, to the community approach, to the land, to the centrality of life and care uncomfortable. Especially when we are faced with the choice between continuing to sustain the extractivist and environmentally destructive dynamics imposed by neoliberal modernity and North–South colonial dynamics through armed violence, or simply decreasing, destroying the systems of domination and surviving.

Today, feminists from all over the world are once again taking to the streets shouting “No to war, no to NATO”, as an amendment to the whole, to a predatory militarism of human lives and resources, of habitats, of economies, which hopelessly condemns us to an extremely precarious existence, if not directly to extinction.

The institutions and organisations that make their living from war continue to instrumentalise the fight against patriarchy and choose women to lead them, as NATO will do at the summit to be held at the end of June in Madrid. This does not improve the living conditions of the rest of women, quite the contrary in many cases.

In the meantime, anti-militarist feminists continue to demand all wars to be stopped, that the military industry be dismantled and reconverted, that defence budgets be drastically reduced, that states disarm and that peace is not just a trite slogan, but a policy of relations that is deployed at all levels. From interpersonal to inter-state. Without violence, without injustice, without exploitation. We will not settle for less.


NATO’s Lisbon Summit (2010) adopted the Strategic Concept document. This document analyses the strategic defence and security environment and sets out the Alliance’s course of action. With respect to its nuclear policy, it makes explicit (point 17) that deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, is a central element of its strategy. While saying that the use of nuclear weapons is remote, it states that “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”. It goes on to add, in point 18, that nuclear forces guarantee the security of Alliance members, and that this security is provided by the United States, especially the United Kingdom and France. Nuclear weapons will therefore remain crucial to NATO.

A new strategy document is expected to be adopted at the next summit in Madrid in June 2022, but we do not expect it to change nuclear policy significantly. Nuclear weapons issues are discussed in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which acts as the highest body on nuclear issues and is chaired by NATO’s Secretary General. The policies agreed represent the common position of all member states. All member states, nuclear-armed or non-nuclear-armed, are members of the NPG, except France, which chose not to participate.

NATO justifies the possession of nuclear weapons “because nuclear deterrence remains necessary and effective” and “[demonstrates] NATO’s ability and determination to impose unacceptable costs in excess of any anticipated gains”. Very similar justification to that of US nuclear policy. NATO considers Russia as a threat because it is developing new nuclear weapons, which is quite true. However, it omits that all NATO nuclear states have nuclear weapons renewal and modernisation programmes underway (notably the multi-billion dollar US programme, with expenditure of more than $500 billion over ten years).

5.2 A LITTLE HISTORY WILL HELP US UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT SITUATION.

On the one hand, the US and Russia (formerly the USSR) have always monopolised more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the
US has always led NATO’s policies, because of its military supremacy. Finally, we have to remember that NATO was born as a defence of the West against the USSR. All these reasons justify the fact that we are dealing with the bilateral nuclear relations between these two states.

First, in 1972, the USSR and the US signed the ABM Treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) which limited the number of ballistic missile defence systems, systems that intercept possible nuclear missile attacks. In 2002, the Bush administration unilaterally withdrew from the ABM. This gave it a free hand to expand the number or coverage of its missile shields. In fact, as early as 2007, the Bush administration planned a missile shield in Europe with radars in the Czech Republic and a launch base in Poland, which was never realised because of the Czech parliament’s rejection. However, shortly afterwards, in 2009, the Obama Administration approved the installation of the shield, with a new location in Romania, Poland (defence radars and interceptors) and Spain (naval component of the shield). It provoked a reaction from Russia, which saw its offensive capabilities weakened or, in other words, the balance of nuclear forces between the two powers broken. The former Russian President Medvedev, following the first steps of the shield’s implementation, declared: “[...] weakening our containment potential [...] the US and other NATO partners are not ready to take our concerns into consideration". NATO agreed that the US shield in Europe had to be an integral part of any future NATO missile defence architecture.

The European sites, including the Bay of Cadiz, of the US missile defence shield have become potential military targets for US rivals.

Second, in 1977 the Kremlin decided to install medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles in the USSR, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In response, in December 1979, NATO approved the installation of medium-range nuclear missiles on European territory. Europe thus became a potential theatre of nuclear war. This strained relations between the two blocs. After lengthy and laborious negotiations, the INF Treaty on the elimination of short- and medium-range nuclear missiles (between 500 and 5,500 km) was signed in December 1987. This eliminated 2,692 ballistic and cruise missiles from both powers. It was a key step towards ending Cold War tensions and represented a security guarantee for Europe. Unfortunately, in recent years, both countries have accused each other of violating the Treaty. They did not try hard enough to resolve these disagreements and finally, in 2019, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the INF. It seems that the US aim is to disengage from any disarmament commitments. One possible consequence of this decision is that Europe could once again be the theatre of a potential nuclear war.

The West’s enormous mistrust of Russia is also due to NATO’s enlargement into Eastern European countries, encircling Russian territory. In 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker promised USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev that if Moscow allowed Germany to reunify, NATO would not expand “one inch” beyond Germany. In the thirty years since then, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have joined the Atlantic Alliance from the former Warsaw Pact countries. Russian leaders’ repeated complaints about NATO’s eastward expansion are remarkably reminiscent of those voiced by former President Medvedev in the wake of the launch of the missile defence shield in Europe.

5.3 NATO MEMBERS’ NUCLEAR ARSENALS

NATO has no nuclear forces of its own; its nuclear capabilities are those of its nuclear-armed members, which are the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Let’s look at the capabilities of each.

According to SIPRI, the arsenals of these states are shown in Table 1. In this table we have also included the arsenals of the other nuclear-weapon states for comparison.

The US has nuclear weapons available for use from land-based missiles (called ICBMs), from submarines (SLBMs) and from aircrafts. Of the approximately 1,800 deployed warheads, 1,400 are strategic (very long-range) deployed on ballistic missiles (400 ICBMs and 1,000 SLBMs) and about 300 are on strategic bomber airbases.

The US has 400 land-based ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of the Minuteman III type. Each of these ICBMs carries one warhead; however, some could carry two or three warheads.

The US Navy maintains a fleet of 14 Ohio-class submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles. Eight operate in the Pacific Ocean and six in the Atlantic.
Normally, 12 of the 14 submarines are considered operational, while the other two are under repair and overhaul. Four or five of these submarines are believed to be on full alert, while another four or five could be on full alert in a matter of hours or days. Each submarine can carry up to 20 Trident II D5 missiles. Each Trident can carry up to eight warheads, but they normally carry an average of four or five warheads.

The US Air Force currently operates 20 B-2A bombers and 87 B-52 H bombers. An estimated 60 of these bombers are assigned nuclear missions.

The US (and therefore NATO’s) arsenal is inordinate. Former Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright believes that the US arsenal could be reduced to 900 operational warheads and 1,500 in reserve. In the same vein, William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997, states that “the submarine force is already sufficient to deter our enemies and will be for the foreseeable future”. The US nuclear arsenal currently stands at 5,550 warheads (see table 1). By contrast, China has an arsenal of about 350 warheads and claims to have a nuclear arsenal sufficient to ensure its defence.

The United Kingdom has some 225 nuclear warheads, of which up to 120 are operational. These warheads can only be launched from the four Vanguard-class nuclear submarines and constitute the UK’s only nuclear platform. Each submarine is equipped with 16 Trident missile launchers. One of the four submarines is on patrol at sea permanently. Two more are docked in port and can be deployed at short notice, and the fourth is under review.

The French nuclear arsenal is approximately 300 warheads. Almost all of these are deployed or available for deployment at short notice. France has three nuclear-capable submarines of the Triomphant class. One submarine is on patrol, one is in port and the third is under review. In addition, the air force has 40 Rafale aircrafts that can deliver nuclear-capable cruise missiles.

NATO’s nuclear capability is 6,025 warheads, representing 46 per cent of the world’s total. Most of this arsenal belongs to the United States, which historically has always had a very large share of the world’s nuclear arsenal. One third of this nuclear capability, 2,200 warheads, are deployed, i.e. installed in operational forces.

### 5.4 US Bombs in Europe

The first US bombs arrived in Europe in September 1954 and were installed at US military bases in the UK. Over the next decade, the US also deployed nuclear weapons in other European states: Germany, Italy, Greece, France, Turkey, the Netherlands and Belgium. Their aim was to have nuclear weapons in Europe for use in the event of a Soviet attack. Some of these

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**Table 1. Arsenals of NATO nuclear weapon states and other nuclear weapon states**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Warheads Deployed</th>
<th>Other Warheads **</th>
<th>Total 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>5,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total NATO</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,865</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,065</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,625</td>
<td>4,630</td>
<td>6,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>[40–50]</td>
<td>[40–50]</td>
<td>[40–50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,825</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,255</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,080</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces.

**Warheads in storage or in reserve and warheads retired pending dismantlement.*

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weapons were gravity bombs (to be dropped from aircraft) and others were installed on ground-based missiles. In 2008, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons from the UK. Today, about 100 US bombs remain in Europe, spread across air bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, all of which are gravity bombs of the B61 type.

Under normal circumstances, these nuclear weapons are kept under the control of US Air Force personnel. The Belgian, Dutch, German and Italian air forces are assigned nuclear strike missions with US nuclear weapons. The US is the only country in the world that has its own nuclear weapons outside its borders.

In 2013, the Obama Administration presented a programme to modernise its nuclear arsenal, which included replacing the current B61 bombs deployed in Europe with the new B61-12. This new weapon will have a guided tracking system that will give it greater precision to achieve certain targets. Until now, the US has not deployed guided nuclear weapons in Europe. The combination of the new B61-12 bomb model with the future F35 aircraft will increase US and NATO nuclear capabilities in Europe. In November 2021, the B61-12 bomb upgrade programme was completed and the first unit was built. Its production will start in May 2022.

The presence of nuclear weapons in Europe can be seen as a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, since this treaty stipulates that signatory states undertake (Article I) not to transfer nuclear weapons to another non-nuclear-weapon state.

The upgrade of US nuclear weapons to Europe has been interpreted by the Russian authorities as a further threat to their national defence.

5.5 NATO AND THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NATO membership also has other consequences. European countries that are also members of the Alliance were “invited” to oppose the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Indeed, on 27 October 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to start negotiations on a treaty to eliminate and prohibit nuclear weapons in 2017. There were 123 votes in favour, 38 against and 16 abstentions. The majority of negative votes were from NATO members. The reason was a note (dated 17 October 2016) from the US addressed to the other member states of the Atlantic Alliance, strongly urging them to vote against the resolution. It argued that a treaty banning nuclear weapons would run counter to NATO’s basic policy on deterrence. They were also asked not to participate in the negotiations scheduled for 2017 (a “request” that was also complied with). Submission to the slogans of this note demonstrates that NATO member states’ decisions are subject to the dictates of the US. It also shows that the rulers of these countries disregard the will of their citizens. Indeed, at the end of 2020, polls were conducted in six European NATO countries (Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) and the opinion in favour of joining the TPNW exceeded 75% of the population. In 2019, a similar poll in Germany showed 68 per cent in favour of membership.

5.6 CONCLUSION: WHAT DOES NATO MEMBERSHIP MEAN FOR EUROPE?

We believe that NATO membership is not in the interests of the European countries that are members of NATO. There is no shortage of arguments in favour of this assertion.

NATO membership implies subordination to US interests and guidelines. This applies not only to defence, but also to foreign policy and relations with the rest of the world. It is a colossal mistake to identify US interests with those of Europe.

Membership of an organisation that is ultimately nothing more than a military bloc implies a militarised worldview, and this means prioritising militarised responses to conflicts over other possibilities. It also means a continuous process of rearmament. Moreover, member states become military targets for potential adversaries of the United States.

Outside NATO, European countries that harbour US nuclear weapons could be able to get rid of them. We never tire of stressing the extent to which the very existence of nuclear weapons is a danger in itself.

Outside NATO, European countries could reflect on whether or not to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an essential step on the road to global disarmament. By joining, they would take on board the majority opinion of the public.
6. NATO OPERATIONS AND ENERGY SECURITY
Alejandro Pozo Marín

6.1 INTRODUCTION

NATO was created in 1949 against the Soviet Union. However, it did not lead any military operations throughout the Cold War. According to the Alliance itself, its first mission came in August 1990, in Turkey, in connection with the military operation against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait;\(^{19}\) that first intervention was already related to energy security;\(^{20}\) since then, NATO has been involved in dozens of missions, and energy security has featured prominently among the motivations. The purpose of this article is to sustain that motivational relationship.

NATO’s missions have developed in a regime of complementarity, coordination and cooperation with other frameworks, including the EU,\(^ {21}\) military coalitions and interventions by NATO member states. It is therefore no easy task to separate NATO missions from other military actions undertaken by NATO member states, and there are at least two limitations to any NATO-specific study. The first is that some countries only partially consider their operational contribution to the Alliance. This is the case, among others, for Canada\(^ {22}\) and the United Kingdom.\(^ {23}\) For example, the concept of “incremental cost” does not include as a contribution to an overseas intervention the salaries of deployed personnel or the maintenance of military equipment, on the grounds that, without a military mission, these costs would be incurred anyway. In our view, this reasoning is refutable. Moreover, contributions to NATO can be ad hoc and mix different logics. For example, since 2016 the German navy has only occasionally been involved in the Sea Guardian operation in the Mediterranean, ‘usually with ships in transit to other deployments’.\(^ {24}\) The second limitation lies in the extreme overlap of certain missions. For example, it is not possible to obtain separate data on theoretically distinct interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria. The US has made no distinction in reporting on operations “Resolute Support” (NATO) and “Sentinel” (nor previously between “ISAF” and “Enduring Freedom”, its

20. It supported a military intervention that, while not NATO, was participated in by NATO member states and led by the US. According to Paul Gallis, the objective was not only to “liberate Kuwait”, but also to “ensure that Iraq would not control Kuwaiti oil and threaten Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers”. Paul Gallis, NATO and Energy Security, CongressionalResearchService, referenceRS22409, 28 December 2007, p. 4.
21. According to the Lisbon Treaty, its common security policy was born out of NATO precepts. This is also expressed in recent official EU documents: “When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most member states [...]. the EU will deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of both”. See EU, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 20.
predecessors), and the UK did not refer to its military action in Afghanistan by these names but as a whole, calling it operation “Toral”. In Iraq/Syria, the US does not explicitly differentiate between NATO’s mission in Iraq, NATO’s support for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS or other military forms of international counter-terrorism coalitions, and has referred to the whole as Operation Inherent Resolve. For its part, Canada calls its contribution to fighting Islamic State operation ‘Impact’, while for the UK it is operation ‘Shader’. While NATO requires a certain homogeneity in terms of information, the unclear separation with other logics makes differentiated analysis between what NATO does and what its member states do very difficult, and in some cases impossible.

6.2 NATO AND ENERGY SECURITY

NATO regards energy supply disruption and pipeline sabotage as security risks, and attaches the greatest importance to them. Indeed, NATO estimates that the most likely threats to the Allies over the next decade are unconventional and include disruptions to energy supply lines and shipping lines. For NATO, “any substantial or sudden disruption of supplies to an Ally would be a cause for concern, especially if the disruption were caused by sabotage of energy infrastructure or illicit interference with maritime commerce”.

At the Bucharest summit in 2008, NATO members identified guiding principles and recommendations on ‘NATO’s role in energy security’, a role reiterated at subsequent summits, such as Lisbon (2010) and Brussels (2018). NATO 2030: United for a New Era accepts that NATO’s energy agenda has been influenced by the evolving global landscape, and states that competition for scarce energy resources will increase over the next decade, a situation that must be monitored. According to the document, “allies recognise energy security as part of their common security”. Among the recommendations are those calling for “NATO to ensure that energy security becomes a major focus of engagement with partners that are energy producers or transit countries” and that “NATO should remain mindful of the importance of ensuring the uninterrupted supply of necessary energy resources and the availability of infrastructure in order to determine the continuity of Article 5 operations and non-article 5 operations”.

The realisation of these concerns in military operations takes place in both energy production and transport contexts. Among the former, the Middle East, with its epicentre in Iraq and Russia’s sphere of influence, stand out for their dependence. In terms of transit, the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea.

6.3 MILITARY MISSIONS

The Horn of Africa is one of the most militarised areas in the world. In 2008, as many as 52 countries had a military presence, with maritime trade being a shared general interest. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic trade route for oil and natural gas. Every day in 2018, an estimated 6.2 million barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products passed through it to Europe, the US and Asia (in 2014 it was 5.1 million). According to the EIA, in 2017, it was about 9% of the total amount of such goods transported by sea. There have been NATO military operations in the region, but also under other flags. However, the synergies of many of them with the Alliance are undeniable. On the one hand, the Allies have composed and often commanded Combined Maritime Forces (CTFs): CTF 150 (maritime security), CTF 151 (anti-piracy), CTF 152 (maritime security in the Gulf) and CTF 153 (launched on 17 April 2022 and led by the United States, on maritime security in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mande and the Gulf of Aden). On the other hand, these operations expressly pursue cooperation with NATO, EU or member states’ missions, and according to NATO itself, “by protecting important sea lanes, NATO’s counter-piracy operations have also made an indirect contribution to energy security”. Professor Filip Ejdus argues that London should be interested in continuing its participation in the EU mission in Somalia, “especially since 65 percent of oil and gas supplies to the UK pass through the Gulf of Aden”.

In the Mediterranean Sea, the military operational logic is related to migration control. However, there are also economic interests in the extraction and...
transports of natural resources, which partly explain NATO’s Sea Guardian mission. This mission has been officially assisting the EU’s Sophia operation against human trafficking, with information and logistical support, and with objectives that also include intelligence and counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{37} NATO estimates that 85 percent of all international trade in raw materials and manufactured goods travels by sea, and tankers carry more than half of the world’s oil;\textsuperscript{38} also that “about 65% of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe passes through the Mediterranean”.\textsuperscript{39} The Alliance relies on the multinational Standing Naval Forces to pursue objectives ranging from maritime and energy security to geopolitics. In February 2016, NATO announced the involvement of military vessels in the Aegean Sea, supposedly for reconnaissance, intelligence and surveillance of human smuggling networks. However, researcher Ioannis Chapsos pointed out the unclear objectives of this operation and that these activities could well be aimed at Russian military vessels, given that the Aegean is the only route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and the only way to reach Syria.\textsuperscript{40}

In the Middle East, NATO member states have been engaged in military efforts for decades to secure energy resources, among other things. In 2006, according to a US congressional report, the Allies questioned how to respond to an oil supply disruption caused by military action and considered protecting oil traffic and platforms during periods of armed conflict, and using monitoring satellites “in areas where energy resources are threatened”.\textsuperscript{41} The Middle East and North Africa is by far the region of the world with the most energy disruptions, the most of the 19 recorded in the global oil market until 2019.\textsuperscript{42} Western military operations in Iraq and Syria have generally not carried the NATO flag. An exception is the NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI), established in October 2018, defined as a mission to combat terrorism by strengthening Iraqi security institutions. However, as we have seen, the enormous military involvement of countries such as the US, the UK and Canada in the region cannot be dissociated from the Atlanticist logic.

Finally, Russia. Long before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO strengthened its presence on Russia’s borders, with heavy deployments in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Yet NATO’s Atlanticist moves in Europe in relation to Moscow far exceed these missions.\textsuperscript{43} For example, they also add up to Assurance Measures, which include, according to the Alliance, the use of airspace control and surveillance aircraft; intelligence and reconnaissance activities; assistance to countries to enhance their special operations capabilities; maritime patrol aircraft and standing naval forces; and training and exercises on the eastern border to improve interoperability.\textsuperscript{44}

### 6.4 CONCLUSION

NATO was born in opposition to Moscow and today strengthens its legitimation against it. As in the other regions analysed, NATO’s relations and concerns about Russia are not limited to energy security interests, but these are nevertheless key.

The Russian invasion and imposed sanctions add to other concerns such as instability in production and transit zones, resource depletion and increasing competition in demand.

The pattern of alliances is changing and the medium to long term situation is uncertain with regard to diversification of sources and alternatives.

Reducing Allied dependence on Russian resources will lead to a reconfiguration of NATO’s power relations with other countries. It will come as no surprise that Alliance military operations serve this purpose.

\textsuperscript{38} NATO, “NATO’s maritime activities”, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm
\textsuperscript{39} NATO, “Operation Sea Guardian”, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{40} Ioannis Chapsos, “Who are NATO’s ships in the Aegean really keeping an eye on?”, The Conversation, 16 February 2016, https://theconversation.com/who-are-natos-ships-in-the-aegean-really-keeping-an-eye-on-54665
\textsuperscript{41} Paul Gallis, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{43} See Alejandro Pozo, “La militarización de la Posguerra Fría Post-Criada en el tablero ucraniano”, Papeles de Relaciones Ecosociales y Cambio Global, no. 157, 2022, pp. 49–59. Ukraine has contributed to NATO missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the maritime missions Active Endeavour and OceanShield. Note that this cooperation did not cease with Viktor Yanukovych in power.
\textsuperscript{44} NATO, “NATO Assurance Measures”, 2021, https://shape.nato.int/nato-assurance-measures
7. NATO AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Javier García Raboso

7.1 INTRODUCTION. CLIMATE CRISIS AND SECURITY

The consequences of climate change are having an increasingly visible impact on all social and political spheres and across the globe. In its latest report, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes a scenario of projected temperature increases of between 2.3 and 2.7°C by 2100, accompanied by significant changes in weather patterns and an increasing incidence of extreme weather events such as cyclones, heat waves or prolonged droughts, as well as a progressive rise in sea levels. It also notes as an immediate consequence an increase in food insecurity in large regions, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Central America. In fact, it notes that the average productivity of corn, wheat and rice crops has already been reduced by 5%. At the same time, it warns of possible difficulties of access to drinking water in the coming decades for an estimated population of between 800 and 3 billion people.


Already in 2007, the UN Security Council addressed this issue, noting with concern the consequences of climate change on what were understood to be “cardinal security issues”, in relation to floods, disease, famine and population displacement; or that droughts and crop failures could lead to more intense competition for food, water and energy. In 2009, the UN for the first time defined climate change as a “threat multiplier”, identifying some potential security impacts and proposing contingency measures that should be taken by states. In 2021, the Secretary General repeated the approach, making the same point: “When climate change dries up rivers, reduces harvests, destroys critical infrastructure and displaces communities, it exacerbates the risks of instability and conflict”.

There is thus a growing concern about the impact that climate change may have on security, which is understood in a variety of ways. While this link has been approached by research institutes and environmental organizations, it is also recognized by governments and international organizations such as NATO.

organisations from a human security, climate justice or environmental peace perspective, the priority approach of governments and most of the think tanks that advise them has been that of national security. Indeed, the security strategies of much of the international community have been incorporating climate change as a destabilising element of a different nature to conventional threats. In the recent Global Risk Report 2022, produced by the Davos Economic Forum, the experts consulted identified the effects of climate change, extreme weather events and biodiversity loss as the main concerns in the top three positions of the global risk perception survey, in that order.

The International Military Council’s Expert Group on Climate and Security (IMCCS) recently released a new report urging militaries to reduce their emissions to minimise fossil fuel-related operational vulnerabilities, to reduce geopolitical dependencies and to ‘fight’ climate change. It also urges NATO and EU security officials to guide low-emission military procurement processes and raise energy efficiency standards, using the turning point of the war in Ukraine to stimulate technological innovation and “enable the private sector to bring low-carbon solutions to the market”.

7.2 NATO AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A SECURITY AGENDA

Aware of the operational impact that the environmental dimension can have on its performance, NATO has been incorporating this aspect from a security perspective for more than 50 years. In 1969, it created the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) to promote research on issues such as pollution and hazardous waste management. In 2006, it merged with NATO’s Scientific Committee into the Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) to address new security challenges, including the environment. The Strategic Concept approved in 2010 already incorporates climate change as a variable to be considered, although hardly developed, and in February 2014 the Alliance approved the so-called Green Defence Framework, presented at the Wales Summit, committing to improve energy efficiency in the military and to minimise its environmental footprint.

A specific plan on climate change will be adopted in 2021, within the framework of the NATO 2030 Agenda, which proposes to “combat and adapt” to climate change through the adoption of an Action Plan on Climate Change and Security. This ten-point document calls for “the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and facilities” with the goal of “achieving net zero emissions by 2050”, initiating the path to what the plan itself calls the “greening of armies”. The Alliance again defines climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ in a global context of instability, amplifying pre-existing threats, including foreseeable changes in territorial configuration that will intensify geostrategic competition for resources, especially in the Arctic with the opening of new maritime routes, as well as ‘new geopolitical conditions’ potentially exploitable by state or non-state actors, with special attention also to the Sahel.

In terms of the Plan’s specific measures, these include a) raising Allies awareness through an annual assessment of the impact of climate change and security on NATO’s strategic environment and on NATO’s assets, facilities, missions and operations; b) with respect to climate change adaptation, integrating climate change into defence planning, training and response mechanisms in order to adapt to extreme and changing climatic conditions; c) in terms of mitigation measures, they propose monitoring greenhouse gas emissions from their activities and facilities, in order to “formulate voluntary targets” for reducing them and facilitate financial and technological investment decisions by their partners; finally, d) among the improvement measures, they propose fostering “dialogue” with their partners, international organisations, civil society and the academic world for the design of future proposals.

In 2022, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly issued a specific recommendation on climate change in its
7.3 GREENWASHING ARMIES

A number of conclusions can be briefly drawn from the above regarding the terms in which the relationship between the climate crisis and security in NATO’s real and symbolic environment is framed. On the one hand, plans to reduce emissions clash head-on with the demand to increase military spending to 2 percent of GDP for all NATO countries, especially in the new context generated by the war in Ukraine. Thus, it seems that willingness to act on the climate emergency in the military sector is contingent on the effectiveness of operations, among other factors. This issue is particularly serious if we consider that the US Department of Defence, which is responsible for nearly 70% of the Alliance’s budget, is the institutional actor that generates the most emissions worldwide, reaching 212 million tonnes of CO2 in 2017, almost double the emissions of Belgium or half those of France in the same year. In the same vein, the Costs of Wars Project points out that “the Pentagon is responsible for causing more GHG emissions than 140 countries combined, including industrialised countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Portugal”. The issue is not a minor one in the context of the European Union either, as it is estimated that the aggregate carbon footprint associated with the defence sector could reach some 24.8 million tonnes of CO2, equivalent to the annual emissions of approximately 14 million cars.

It is also important to note that the emissions of the military sector are not included in the emissions calculations of most countries, due to the voluntary nature of their registration, which, in addition to the lack of transparency, adds to the absence of accountability mechanisms for them, remaining outside the accounting and controls established by the Paris Agreements for other sectors. This reality contrasts with the repeated allusions to “climate neutrality” found in the documents published by the Alliance itself and its members. Thus, exclusionary measures that perpetuate the voluntary nature of the military sector’s emissions reporting and the proliferation of vague discourse on climate commitments, which contravene the warnings of the scientific community and have no verification mechanism, seem closer to the greenwashing practices of large corporations than to effective strategies commensurate with the urgency of the climate crisis in which we find ourselves.

7.4 SECURITY FOR WHOM?

Beyond the decarbonisation initiatives and the other half-hearted measures announced to address the climate crisis, the mission of the Atlantic Alliance is rather to sustain a model that guarantees security for the investments of the countries of the global North and their elites. As Uruguayan activist Silvia Ribeiro points out, “national security schemes, under the pretext of preserving national interests, in reality what they really protect are the economic interests of certain elites of large corporations, along with the lucrative interests of those who pull the strings of the military-industrial complex.”

Far from addressing the issue from a perspective based on principles of climate justice, none of the documents analysed makes any allusion to the historical responsibility of the Alliance countries for the greenhouse gas emissions that have led us to the current situation, or perhaps to the development model based on the exploitation of resources and dispossession of the majorities from which they have benefited since their founding. A security that considers the victims of climate change as threats to global stability only serves to justify increased militarisation and social control, while failing to prioritise the security of the majority of the planet’s inhabitants in the face of the most important challenge of our time.

60. The proposal has been further developed in the NATO document (08.06.2022): “Environment, climate change and security”: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm.

7.5 CONCLUSION

The military’s contribution to the climate crisis is as significant as its lack of transparency and accountability. NATO’s announced emission reduction plans have a markedly greenwashing character, given their low ambition, the omission of concrete measures and their voluntary adoption, which is always contingent on mission effectiveness.

NATO’s approach to climate change is eminently securitarian, avoiding any approach related to climate justice. The very existence of the Alliance contributes to sustaining the colonial model of exploitation of the planet and dispossession of the majorities that is at the root of the climate and environmental crisis in which we find ourselves.
8. NATO IS ALWAYS BOMBING SOMETHING
José Luis Gordillo

8.1 INTRODUCTION

NATO has been involved in several wars throughout its seventy-three-year history. The most important wars in which it has been involved have been the Cold War against the USSR and its allies between 1949 and 1991, the Yugoslav wars of secession between 1991 and 1999, the war in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, the war in Iraq from 2004 to the present, and the war in Libya in 2011. As can be seen, NATO has fought wars almost permanently since its very foundation.

8.2 THE COLD WAR FROM 1949 TO 1991

It was the US and its European allies who initiated the Cold War against the USSR by founding NATO in 1949 (the Warsaw Pact was founded in 1955 in response). They almost always took the lead in the Cold War and were almost always superior in armaments and strike capability. The Cold War affected the entire planet in one way or another. Of the much that can be explained about it, what is interesting to underline now is that the cold war was only cold in comparison to a possible nuclear war between the two military blocs. However, its normal dynamics also had lethal consequences for many people. In that sense, the Cold War was arguably much hotter than many people realise.

NATO’s supremacy was based on the military and economic power of the United States. In 1945, the United States was the only power that did not have to rebuild its industry because it was intact. On the other hand, it was the only state to have produced and used nuclear weapons in a war for the first time.

Today we already know, with good documentary support, that the main political objective of the dropping of the atomic bombs was much more to threaten the USSR than to break the Japanese government, which had already decided to surrender in the spring of 1945.66

It is true that a few years later the USSR and later Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea imitated the US and also equipped themselves with atomic weapons. Atomic weapons, as E.P. Thompson said, are always “a thing that threatens” and therefore it is a mistake to describe them as “defensive weapons”. The possession of atomic weapons and the threat of their use by one side or the other

led to an arms race which, to this day, has been the ultimate expression of the meaninglessness of a one-sided conception of security. This arms race culminated in the 1980s with the accumulation of more than 60,000 nuclear devices, with which, experts said, it was possible to kill every inhabitant of the planet 12 times in a row.

This arms race had at least three consequences that should never be forgotten: 1) the diversion of an enormous amount of resources to manufacture weapons whose best use, their propagandists said, was not to be used, and the consequent impossibility of devoting those resources to, for example, improving health, education or eradicating poverty in the world; 2) led to several moments of near nuclear holocaust due to political decisions by either side, mistakes or accidents involving nuclear weapons;68 3) a continuous succession of atomic explosions, open-air and underground, in the form of “nuclear tests” carried out to make nuclear deterrence credible.

It is worth making this last point. Between 1945 and 2013 there were more than 2,000 atomic explosions.59 These explosions, more than half of which were ordered by the US, French and British governments, resulted in radioactive contamination that caused a dramatic increase in cancers worldwide. According to a study by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, based in Maryland (USA), at least 2,400,000 people died between 1945 and 2000 as a result of the contamination caused by these explosions.70

8.3 THE YUGOSLAV WARS 1992-1999

The end of the Cold War did not, as seemed logical, lead to the dissolution of NATO. On the contrary, it led to its enlargement both in terms of the number of its members (almost half of NATO’s 30 current partners joined NATO after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact) and in terms of its scope of action, which in practice became the whole world, whereas before it was limited, according to the original treaty still in force, to the territory of its member states.

Officially, this was done when NATO’s “new Strategic Concept” was adopted in 1999. This proposed that NATO would act outside the territories of its partner states and without the need for the approval of the UN Security Council. As a result, NATO’s aims became explicitly aggressive and contrary to the basic purposes of the UN Charter.

The first out-of-area war in which NATO intervened was the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995, although it was not formally conducted in violation of international law, as it consisted of securing a no-fly zone pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 781 and carrying out a number of air strikes against Yugoslav forces pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 816, 836 and 958.

However, in 1999, NATO attacked Yugoslavia without any legal backing from the Security Council and without being able to invoke the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the San Francisco Charter. It did so by claiming that genocide was taking place in Kosovo, which was categorically untrue. Consequently, the Atlantic Alliance committed a crime of aggression against Yugoslavia by violating Article 2.4 of the San Francisco Charter. This is exactly the same, from a legal point of view, as the aggression perpetrated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which began on 24 February this year.

Between 24 March and 11 June 1999, NATO aircrafts bombed bridges, roads, railways, factories, oil refineries, petrochemical plants, power stations, hospitals, government buildings, television studios and also government buildings, television studios and also the Chinese embassy. Some 462 soldiers, 114 policemen and about 5,700 Yugoslav civilians were killed.71 Many others were injured and an unknown number (including many of the NATO soldiers who occupied Kosovo after the end of the fighting) contracted various cancers caused by the spread of chemicals and radioactive particles due to the US use of depleted uranium-coated shells. Among the NATO aircraft involved in the attack, there were eight F-18s and two KC-130Hs from the Spanish air force.

8.4 THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 2001 TO 2021

On 7 October 2001, almost four weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the US government gave the order to attack Afghanistan, claiming that those it had identified as the perpetrators of the notorious attacks had enjoyed support and safe haven in that country. Today we know that all this was untrue. As Noam Chomsky rightly said: “The invasion of Afghanistan was illegal because there has never been any evidence that the perpetrators of 9/11 planned the attacks in that country”72.

68. On the former, among the various examples that can be cited, see those mentioned by D. Ellsberg in “Call to Mutiny” in Monthly Review, vol. 33, no. 4, 1981, p. 4; and on the latter see: X. Bohigas and T. de Fortuny, Riesgos y amenazas del arsenal nuclear, Icaria, Barcelona, 2014, pp. 113-117.
69. Ídem, pp. 75-112.
72. As stated by the American linguist to the Iranian Press TV on 3.11.2010. In the same vein he had previously expressed himself in N. Chomsky and G. Achcar, Estados peligrosos, Paidós, Barcelona, 2007, p. 93.
The US proceeded to overthrow the Taliban regime and install a government that defended the interests of Western states in that part of the world. The action taken by the attackers was therefore aimed at regime change, i.e. an objective that was in direct contradiction to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the principle of the self-determination of peoples, two basic pillars of current international law.

Moreover, there was never any UN resolution legalising the attack on Afghanistan. It was therefore another crime of aggression.

NATO intervened after that aggression to “fight terrorism” and to support the government resulting from the intervention, taking over the training of its armed forces. Operation Enduring Freedom, led by the US and its NATO allies, never had any legal cover. ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan), formally led by NATO, by contrast, did.

An estimated 46,000 civilians have been killed by the attackers or by one of the sides that took action after the US attack in October 2001. Far more were wounded or maimed, and 5.3 million people fled Afghanistan and took refuge in neighbouring countries such as Iran and Pakistan.

The Western intervention in Afghanistan ended in the summer of 2021. It has been the longest hot war in which NATO has been involved. It was, in fact, NATO’s Great Neo-colonial War that ended in a resounding defeat as, after twenty years, the Taliban returned to power and the Western armies had no choice but to return home with their tails between their legs. Spain contributed to the war by sending a total of 16,000 soldiers on rotational service.

8.5 THE WAR IN IRAQ FROM 2003 TO THE PRESENT

The second Iraq war began on 20 March 2003 with the US and British invasion. The US government tried to get a UN Security Council resolution passed on 5 February 2003 legalising the invasion. It did not succeed. It was, therefore, another crime of aggression.

To achieve this, the US government claimed before the UN Security Council, through the mouth of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, that Saddam Hussein’s regime had been supporting Al Qaeda for years and could at any time place weapons of mass destruction “in the hands of terrorists”. In less than a year, all these arguments were revealed as outright lies.

The spiral of violence that began with the 2003 invasion resulted in at least 207,156 civilian deaths and 9.2 million displaced persons. Some of these have swelled the ranks of the hundreds of thousands of refugees trying to reach EU countries.

Between 2004 and 2011, NATO intervened to try to consolidate the occupation, once the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime had been consummated. NATO’s assigned objective was to train the police and the new armed forces of the post-invasion government. In 2015, NATO returned to Iraq to support the government and to ‘fight terrorism’ by ISIS. Spain sent 1,300 military personnel between 2003 and 2004, and has maintained a stable contingent of 157 military personnel since 2014. In both cases, in application of several UN Security Council resolutions (1483, 1511 and 2170).

8.6 THE 2011 LIBYAN WAR

Another NATO-driven regime change operation took place between 19 April and 31 October 2011 in Libya.

NATO’s intervention initially took place under the cover of UN Resolution 1973, which called for the protection of the civilian population, which, according to leaders such as Sarkozy and Cameron, could be massacred with chemical weapons. To supposedly prevent this, NATO was to guarantee a no-fly zone in Libya’s skies.

However, it soon became clear that the real aim of NATO’s intervention was to overthrow Gaddafi, who ended up being lynched to then support the creation of a new Western-friendly government. This objective, of course, never had any legal cover. The end result of the operation was to turn Libya into a new “failed state”, as had happened before with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO’s intervention contributed decisively to the outbreak of a protracted civil war that continues to this day. An estimated 250,000 people have died as a result of the spiralling violence that began in 2011.

73. Idem, p 216
74. A. Pozo, La guerra contra el terror, cit., p. 216. The estimate comes from the Brown University report and seems rather conservative. It should be recalled that the prestigious journal The Lancet in 2006 offered an estimate of more than 600,000 people killed in the spiral of violence that began with the invasion.
75. As explained on the website of the Spanish Ministry of Defence: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actualites/listado/2016/03/21/apoyo-a-irak.html
76. According to the data provided in “11th anniversary of NATO’s bombing of Libya” in the digital magazine Nuevatribuna.es, https://www.nuevatribuna.es/articulo/global/11-aniversario-bombardeo-libia-202203191253531986818.html
In 2010, oil-swimming Libya was the country with the highest Human Development Index (HDI) in Africa and ranked 51st in the list of all countries in the world (in the same year, Spain ranked 27th). In the 2020 HDI ranking, Libya was ranked 105th. Since 2011, a considerable proportion of the refugees who risk their lives in the Mediterranean trying to reach European shores have come from Libya.

8.7 IN CONCLUSION

NATO’s involvement in the above-mentioned wars shows how far it is from the intentions set out in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. The latter, at least on paper, was intended to be no more than a practical embodiment of what is prescribed in Article 51 of the UN Charter, i.e. the right to collective self-defence. Its political-military interventions in places as far away from the territories of its member states as the Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, with the aim of promoting regime change, an objective that runs counter to the principle of the self-determination of peoples, is incontrovertible empirical proof of its transformation into an aggressive and imperialist organisation.

The fact that Vladimir Putin, in talks with the UN Secretary General on 26 April, invoked the precedent of NATO’s 1999 attack on Yugoslavia as a compelling argument in an attempt to justify his attack on Ukraine shows the self-destructive character of the international order of policies implemented by Western leaders. The perfect complement to international disorder is the law of the strongest. Indeed, Atlanticist leaders have hardly invoked the violation of international law to criticise Russia, as they are the ones who have excelled in such activity. What they have done is to push for a proxy war in Ukraine to resolve by force what they see as the first round of a new cold war between NATO and Russia/China, which is the same as going back to square one in NATO’s history. There is no doubt: NATO is the best solution to the problems caused by NATO itself.
9. NATO’S NEW SECURITARIAN DRIFT WITH REGARD TO MIGRATION
Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Global security doctrines and practices have a relevant impact on human rights and even on the individual security of people. This is evident, for example, in the massive surveillance systems that have been deployed in the name of security around the world and, importantly, in border areas where it is the people who migrate in a forced and unrecognised legal manner that have been most impacted in recent decades by new security doctrines, conducted in a policing and militaristic manner. In this context, NATO, as the world’s largest military organisation, plays a significant role in the ways in which security is approached and interpreted, not only by its member states, but also by the prevailing security model in the rest of the world.

9.2 SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION

In the same way that has happened with the security strategies of Western states, profound changes have occurred in the way security is understood, especially since the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union and the entry into what will be called a globalised world. Thus the issue of migration, the movement of people and borders, which are opened in this context of globalisation to facilitate the transit of goods, appear as new elements to be taken into account for security, becoming, as the Copenhagen School has defined it, “securitised”. It is important to understand securitisation in this context, which consists of two mechanisms: on the one hand, the narrative, that is, the fact that, in security discourses, the movement of people, borders and migration are interpreted as threats to security, so that policies are then applied for their surveillance and control. This happens from a hegemonic security perspective, since despite the different contributions to reformulate the concept of security - which appear at the end of the 20th century - the police and military mechanics are maintained, i.e. surveillance, control, use of force or the threat to use it, military power and coercion.

In this way, NATO, which after the fall of the Soviet Union should have lost the meaning of its existence, reformulates and adapts its objectives to this new context of globalisation that began in the 1990s, and among these new objectives for the security of its member states is migration.78 However, these objec-

tives, which traditionally were not addressed by military means, appear in the NATO Strategic Concept of 2010:

"Instability or conflict beyond NATO’s borders can directly threaten the Alliance’s security, including by fuelling extremism, terrorism and transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people."

This new perspective of approaching migration as a threat to security, due to the repercussions it can have, is compounded by the way in which migration is considered illegal and therefore a crime. In this way, the possibility of approaching migration from a humanitarian perspective, reinforced by the security narrative, is being diluted. This is compounded by the intensive persecution of mafias and human traffickers who, for migrants and forcibly displaced persons, are, in most cases, the only means of escape from the various forms of violence present in their countries. These factors facilitate the expansion of the security discourse, which places migrants in the context of other forms of crime and encourages the use of militarised methods that considerably affect the rights of migrants. Ultimately, migrants are labelled as "subjects of risk and subjects at risk" so that military operations come to justify their deployment for rescue purposes, when this is an obligation of any vessel if it encounters another vessel in distress. The reality is that these operations are deployed for the surveillance and prosecution of different forms of crime, including irregular migration. At this point it should be noted that irregular migration is sometimes the only option for people fleeing violence and persecution.

In this way, all the ingredients are in place for an approach to migration based on a militaristic narrative and practice which, as Garelli and Tazzioli point out, has led in recent years to the deployment of a whole series of military operations to address migration, especially in the Mediterranean area. In total, three main military operations have been developed to control, monitor and intercept migratory flows and the mafias that transport migrants; Operation Mare Nostrum (2013–2014), which was the first conducted by the Italian government that still maintained coordination with civilian fleets and rescue organisations, an aspect that was lost when it was replaced by Operation Triton (2014–2016), developed by Frontex; Operation EUNAVFOR Sophia deployed under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since 2015; and NATO’s deployment in the Aegean Sea in 2016 (Maritime Group 2, SNMG2). This has progressively led to a greater militarisation of the maritime border space and the approach to migration, in what has been called ‘the war on migration’ in various research studies.

Sarantaki points out that a milestone in NATO’s agenda to address migration was in February 2016 when, at the request of Germany, Greece and Turkey, it was approved to assist the so-called refugee crisis at the borders of the Alliance’s European members. In this way, NATO’s military deployment (Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), came to support the operations that were already being carried out in the Aegean Sea through the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), in order to strengthen the reconnaissance, control and surveillance of the Aegean Sea and international waters (NATO, 2016), where Frontex and the Turkish and Greek coastguards lacked the capacity to act. According to the same author, this operation:

"opens a new and unknown path for the Alliance. It represents a new type of mission and a change in the role of the Alliance that is underway".

9.3 HOW NATO IMPLEMENTS THE SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION

This is therefore a sign of the changes taking place in NATO towards a markedly securititarian path, where migration represents a threat in the new globalisation scenario and which, in a way, the organisation uses to legitimise its existence. This is shown by other measures adopted by the organisation to adapt to various security environments and challenges. To this end, in 2016, a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD) was created at NATO headquarters in Brussels, merging military and civilian intelligence functions.

This NATO military operation deployed in the Aegean Sea (SNMG2) consists of seven military vessels from different NATO members: FGS KARLSRUHE (Germany); RFA CARDIGAN BAY (United Kingdom); TCG BODRUM (Turkey); USNS GRAPPLE (United States); HS AITTITOS (Greece); HS KRATEOS (Greece); HS PSARA (Greece) (NATO, 2016). Although this will be the first time NATO has deployed an operation with this specific mandate
to support migration control and surveillance, the fact is that it was already collaborating with the European Union through its Active Endeavour operation deployed in the Mediterranean since 2001 to monitor and control terrorism. In turn, it collaborated by informing the Greek coastguard about mafias and the routes of migratory flows. Operation Active Endeavour, in response to the increase in migration flows in 2016, changed its objectives and became a broader security operation called Sea Guardian (NATO, 2022). This operation incorporated the control of migration flows among its aims (Sarantaki, 2019: 14). The operation included, in the words of the then German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen (now president of the European Commission), that the agreement with Turkey provided for migrants, including potential asylum seekers, found in Greek waters to be transferred to Turkey.\(^{84}\) It is important to note that while Frontex can only leave migrant boats on European shores, NATO operations allow these boats to be left on the land of another NATO member state, such as Turkey. This is an obvious way, to say the least, of intercepting and diverting migratory flows away from EU countries, which furthermore does not guarantee the protection of migrants, since Turkey, in its accession to the 1951 Refugee Convention, excludes all non-Europeans from refugee status, which makes it easier not to guarantee protection for people fleeing wars such as those in Syria or Iraq.

In all of this, it is worth asking what role NATO has played in this supposed construction of security and stability that it claims to contribute to building, especially considering its role in the militarisation and

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interception of migratory flows. A review of data on forced displacement in three major NATO interventions in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq yields the following data on forcibly displaced persons, which can be seen in the graphs below. The graphs are based on data published by UNHCR for the three countries from the five years prior to the NATO intervention to the present day. In this way, it is possible to compare the situation before and after NATO’s intervention with regard to forced displacement, a relevant indicator of the stability situation in the country.

In Libya, there has been a sharp increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) since 2011 which, as of 2021, has failed to return to pre-intervention levels, meaning that people remain forcibly displaced from their homes. In Afghanistan, the figures are more stable, in part because of the already convulsive situation in the country over the years. Yet there was a peak in displacement in 2001, coinciding with the NATO intervention, which does not diminish over time. In Iraq, a large increase in the number of displaced persons can be observed one year after the intervention, which has not returned to previous levels either, a clear indicator of insecurity in the country. Although the factors that can generate forced displacement are numerous and would require further research, at the very least, a high level of insecurity can be observed among the populations after the three NATO interventions, and that, at the very least, the situation in the three countries has not tended to stabilise. Given that an important indicator of insecurity is the forced displacement of populations, it is possible to state that NATO is far from having contributed to the stabilisation and security of the populations of the countries in which it has intervened.

9.4 CONCLUSIONS

Two main conclusions can be drawn from the aspects mentioned throughout this chapter: on the one hand, NATO is adapting to the new circumstances in the global security environment, where securitisation policies predominate. This means that the Alliance is preparing to address by military means issues that have normally been dealt with from a civilian perspective and with civilian tools. Moreover, they do not correspond to traditional military security issues, such as migration. In this way, the already existing militarisation of migratory flows is strengthened, with the consequent erosion of migrants’ rights. Furthermore, NATO can send back boats of migrants to countries such as Turkey, which do not guarantee the rights of asylum and refuge. In other words, the alliance acts as a key element in the diversion and return of migrants outside European borders.

On the other hand, NATO is far from being an instrument for generating stability and security in complex contexts, as the cases of Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan show. In these three countries, an important security indicator such as forced displacement indicates that pre-intervention levels are not being restored. It is therefore possible to question NATO’s claimed role in contributing to global peace and stability.
The task of responsible politics, the peace movement and other social movements is the relentless analysis of reality, which is not guided by short-term stimuli, but looks below the surface and observes interrelationships. We need such an analysis, especially today, at a time when the world is threatening to come apart at the seams due to war, the climate crisis and growing social inequalities. In response, nationalism and armament are on the rise. Therefore, the escalation of war, violence and armament must be stopped.

Analysis and political conclusions can be found in the report “Common Security 2022: Our Shared Future”. We can only live up to our responsibility if we understand the interrelationships and know the history. For more than a decade, it has been evident that peace is unfinished and endangered. First of all, there is the new arms build-up, which is accompanied by the erosion of arms control and arms limitation, and which is virtually exploding as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and contrary to international law.

The report, which builds on the concept of Common Security first laid out by the Olof Palme Committee in 1982, links the challenges of threatened peace in the world with global challenges. It is a plea for common security and tries to develop a global perspective for it. It incorporates new threats such as the climate crisis and the challenges from social injustices. There is an alternative to deterrence through armament, but only if the concept of common security is taken up and implemented worldwide.

The basic idea of the report is the conviction, already formulated in the first Olof Palme Report of 1982, that security can only be achieved together and never against each other. The security interests of the other are just as legitimate as one’s own and must be taken into account in the sense of cooperative action. War can no longer be the continuation of politics by other means. In the age of nuclear weapons, war is the Ultima Irratio, peace is the Ultima Ratio as Willi Brandt put it in his Nobel Prize speech in 1971.

The new Common Security report formulates in this consequence the following principles of action:

1. All people have the right to human security: freedom from fear and freedom from want.
2. Building trust between nations and peoples is fundamental to peaceful and sustainable human existence.
3. There can be no common security without nuclear disarmament, strong limitations on conventional weapons and reduced military expenditure.
4. Global and regional cooperation, multilateralism and the rule of law are crucial to tackling many of the world’s challenges.
5. Dialogue, conflict prevention and confidence-building measures must replace aggression and military force as a means of resolving disputes.
6. Better regulation, international law and responsible governance also need to be extended to cover new military technologies, such as in the realms of cyberspace, outer space and “artificial intelligence”.

The report is the blueprint for a better world and follows on from the reports of the three Independent UN Commissions of the 1980s, which laid decisive foundations for global policies.

These are Willy Brandt’s “North-South Report”, Gro Harlem Brundtland’s report “Our Common Future” for sustainable development and the Palme report “Common Security”. They must be seen as three parts of the same unit; their guiding idea is called commonality. This idea reached its peak in 1992 with the Rio Earth Summit, but this was also the beginning of its downturn.

Examples of these commonalities can be found in security policy: 1987 saw the INF Treaty, which provided for the scrapping of medium-range missiles between 500 and 5,500 km in the USA and the USSR. Moreover,
in 1990, 32 states plus Canada and the USA adopted the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe": "The age of confrontation and the division of Europe has come to an end [...] Europe is freeing itself from the legacy of the past." A "new era of democracy, peace and unity is dawning".

But the policy of détente became less important. Arms limitation and arms control were neglected; instead, NATO expanded eastward. Since the middle of the last decade, military spending has been rising sharply, reaching more than US$ 2.1 trillion last year, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), of which about 75 percent of spending was done by just 10 countries.

The great opportunities of the historic year 1989 were not seized. At the same time, former Foreign Minister of the FRG Hans-Dietrich Genscher warned: "History does not repeat its offers, and the opportunities it offers us do not last forever." With Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsäcker and Egon Bahr, he urged that Russian offers for a new common European security architecture be given serious consideration. "The key word of our century is cooperation." There is no reason to relativize the idea of peace and détente and common security. Rather, it is worthy of criticism that it has been developed too little. A strengthening of the OSCE and a new Helsinki 2 process are indispensable, at least for Europe.

Putin’s attack on Ukraine, which is contrary to international law, is the first conventional war to take place directly under Russia’s nuclear umbrella. Russia, the world’s strongest nuclear power, has 6,225 nuclear weapons, of which 1,560 are operational. When the peace movement warns again and again of an escalation of the war (especially through NATO’s eastward expansion) and now speaks out against the delivery of heavy weapons, then it is not, as leading NATO politicians defame it, Putin’s “fifth column, politically and militarily”, but it takes seriously what Egon Bahr said about security policy in the logic of Albert Einstein: “The atomic bomb has changed the world, but not thinking”.

The report emphasizes the need for a nuclear-weapon-free world, given 14,000 nuclear weapons and permanent modernization in all nuclear-weapon states. Deterrence is not a security and peace policy, but rather wagers the destruction of humanity as a consequence of its failure. One of the most important demands of the report is support for an immediate resumption of strategic peace talks between the U.S. and Russia, as well as the resumption of the U.S.-China strategic dialogue aimed at the final elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

The second important lesson is that the wars of the last decades have shown that there are no winners anymore, even if the aggressor is militarily successful. Putin, too, can offer Ukraine nothing but stagnation and destruction. There is no alternative but to bring both sides - moderated by OSCE or UN - to the negotiating table. The report “Common Security 2022”, which is based on a broader understanding of security that includes social and environmental threats, is the way to achieve a new balance and a comprehensive disarmament process.

Set in a longer perspective of confidence building and future peace building, the need for an immediate ceasefire and negotiations is emphasized. The spiral of violence must be stopped.

In this logic of a comprehensive peace and security architecture, the report also formulates the limitation, overcoming and dissolution of all military alliances and their replacement by inclusive security and peace institutions. This is the urgent consequence of the failure of the Western policy of the 1990s and 2000s, which saw NATO’s eastward expansion against all warnings and with complete disregard for Russian security interests.

The report describes the strengthening of a new architecture of peace, the use of the peace dividend for climate protection and more social justice, the revival of arms control and disarmament against new military technologies and space weapons. The escalation of war, on the other hand, is the road to disaster. Alternatively, disarmament is the key to shaping a cooperative future in the face of 2 trillion in arms spending. In view of the current situation - the Ukraine war with its long history- this is of even greater importance than before. Cooperation is indispensable to solving global challenges from climate crisis to pandemic to global justice.

These key points of the Palme Report 2 can be found in the recommendations, which are summarized in the report under the following 4 main points:

1. Strengthening the Global Architecture for Peace
2. A New Peace Dividend - Disarmament and Development
3. Revitalised Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament
4. New Military Technologies and Outer Space Weapon

The individual formulations are demands for the organization of world-wide peace processes. They call for a new political movement for arms control, comprehensive disarmament, and demilitarization of politics in favor of the solution of the global challenges. These are recommendations that should be concretized and further developed.
The outline shows the emphasis on the core challenges of our time and connects the unmistakable globalization of international peace requirements with the need for the regionalization of international security policy.

The report seeks to encourage: "In times of acute crisis, there must be those who look forward and give a vision of a better future."

Indispensable is the action of the people, every individual but especially the peace movement. Without civil society, the future cannot be achieved and shaped. This report is not only a call to action but also to protest, when politics refuses the principles of the report and ignores the necessary peace logic of action by emphasizing the logic of war. It is addressed to politics with the request to act in the sense of the report. It is addressed to each individual to let the ideas of the report - in the sense of Antonio Gramsci’s “cultural hegemony” - become reality.

The full report in English, German, French and Spanish can be found at: https://www.ipb.org/activities/common-security-report-2022/.
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