Ceasefire and Peace for Ukraine

A Collection of Proposals and Possibilities for a Ceasefire and Resolution to the Conflicts between Russia and Ukraine

November, 2022
Ceasefire and Peace for Ukraine:

A Collection of Proposals and Possibilities for a Ceasefire and Resolution to the Conflicts between Russia and Ukraine
Table of Contents

Ceasefire and Peace for Ukraine: Introduction 3
Minsk 2 Agreements 2015 and Normandie Format 4
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 7
Istanbul Peace Talks March 29-10 10
Italy’s 4 point Peace Plan May 20, 2022 12
The Vatican: Reaching a Just and Lasting Peace in Ukraine June 6-7 2022 15
The NPT Review Conference, August 26 2022 21
Mexican Peace Proposal 25
Resolution of the IPB Council in Ghent 28
Ceasefire and Peace for Ukraine: Introduction

A collection of existing proposals and possible steps, ending the war in Ukraine through diplomacy rather than weapons

The war in Ukraine is causing suffering, death and devastation. With each day that passes, more and more people are killed, physically injured or psychologically traumatized. As the war continues, the risk that it will spread or escalate to other states increases. Among other consequences, the war in Ukraine has worsened the global food crisis by threatening supply chains and driving up the prices for food, fertilizer and fuel.

Military escalation must be curtailed to end the war as quickly as possible, and a ceasefire and peace negotiations are necessary to achieve this. Russia's attack on Ukraine is illegal under international law, and the Russian government bears responsibility for this. At the same time, it requires joint action to end the war and to establish peace. The South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor put it this way, “The world has a responsibility to bring about peace.” Yet, despite the immeasurable suffering caused by the war, there are currently no direct negotiations between the Russian and Ukrainian governments. We see the danger of a war of attrition lasting for years with catastrophic humanitarian consequences for the people of Ukraine and worldwide. It calls for immediate negotiations and a diplomatic solution.

Below is a collection of proposals and possibilities for a ceasefire as well as ways toward a resolution of the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine.

Reiner Braun, Former Executive Director of the International Peace Bureau
Sean Conner, Executive Director of the International Peace Bureau
Alessandra Fontanella, Assistant Coordinator, IPB
Minsk 2 Agreements 2015 and Normandie Format

Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements
1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation starting from 00.00 AM (Kiev time) on the 15th of February, 2015.

2. Withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides on equal distances in order to create a security zone at least 50 km wide from each other for the artillery systems with caliber greater than 100mm and more, a security zone of 70 km wide for MLRS and 140 km wide for MLRS “Tornado-C”, “Uragan”, “Smerch” and Tactical missile systems “Tochka” (“Tochka U”):
   - for the Ukrainian troops: from the de facto line of contact;
   - for the armed formations from certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblast of Ukraine from the line of contact according to the Minsk memorandum of September 19, 2014.

The withdrawal of the heavy weapons as specified above is to start on day 2 of the ceasefire at the latest and to be completed within 14 days.

The process shall be facilitated by the OSCE and supported by the Trilateral Contact Group.

3. Ensure effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from the day 1 of the withdrawal, using all technical equipment necessary, including satellites, drones, radar equipment, etc.

4. Launch a dialogue, on day 1 of the withdrawal on modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine “On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions” as well as on the future regime of these areas based on this Law.

Adopt promptly, by no later than 30 days after the date of signing of the document a resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine specifying the area enjoying the special regime, under the Law of Ukraine On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions”, based on the line of the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.

6. Ensure release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons, based on the principle “all for all”. This process is to be finished on the day 5 after the withdrawal at the latest.
7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.

8. Definition of modalities of full resumption of socio-economic ties, including social transfers, such as pension, payments and other payments (incomes and revenues, timely payments of all utility bills, reinstating taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine).
   To this end, Ukraine shall reinstate control of the segment of its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers shall be established.

9. Reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area, starting on day 1 after the local elections and ending after the comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) to be finalized by the end of 2015, provided that paragraph 11 has been implemented in consultation with and upon agreement by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under monitoring of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new Constitution entering into force by the end of 2015, providing for decentralization as a key element (including a reference to the specificities of certain areas in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these areas), as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote until the end of 2015.

12. Based on the Law of Ukraine “On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions”, questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.

13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.

Participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:
Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini
Second President of Ukraine, L.D. Kuchma
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine, M.Y. Zurabov
A.V. Zakharchenko
I.V. Plotnitskiy

Document available here:
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations March 2 2022

With 141 yes 5 no and 35 abstain

The General Assembly, Reaffirming the paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in the promotion of the rule of law among nations, Recalling the obligation of all States under Article 2 of the Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, Recalling also the obligation under Article 2 (2) of the Charter, that all Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter, Taking note of Security Council resolution 2623 (2022) of 27 February 2022, in which the Council called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the question contained in document S/Agenda/8979, Recalling General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, entitled “Uniting for peace”, and taking into account that the lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council at its 8979th meeting has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security

Recalling also its resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, in which it approved the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirming the principles contained therein that the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force, and that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a State or country or at its political independence is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter, Recalling further its resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which defines aggression as the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter, Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace founded upon freedom, equality, justice and respect for human rights and of developing friendly relations among nations irrespective of their political, economic and social systems or the levels of their development

Recalling the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, and the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) of 5 December 1994, Condemning the 24 February 2022 declaration by the Russian Federation of a “special military operation” in Ukraine, Reaffirming that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal, Expressing grave concern at reports of attacks on civilian facilities such as residences, schools and hospitals, and of civilian casualties, including women, older persons, persons with disabilities, and children, Recognizing that the military operations of the Russian Federation inside the sovereign territory of Ukraine are on a scale that the international community has not seen in Europe in decades and that urgent action is needed to save this generation from the scourge of war, Endorsing the Secretary-General’s statement of 24 February 2022 in which he recalled that the use of force by one
country against another is the repudiation of the principles that every country has committed to uphold and that the present military offensive of the Russian Federation is against the Charter.

Condemning the decision of the Russian Federation to increase the readiness of its nuclear forces, Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in and around Ukraine, with an increasing number of internally displaced persons and refugees in need of humanitarian assistance, Expressing concern also about the potential impact of the conflict on increased food insecurity globally, as Ukraine and the region are one of the world’s most important areas for grain and agricultural exports, when millions of people are facing famine or the immediate risk of famine or are experiencing severe food insecurity in several regions of the world, as well as on energy security, Welcoming the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international and regional organizations to support de-escalation of the situation with respect to Ukraine, and encouraging continued dialogue,

**Aggression against Ukraine A/RES/ES-11/13/422-04067**

1. Reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters;

2. Deplores in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter;

3. Demands that the Russian Federation immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and to refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any Member State;

4. Also demands that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;

5. Deplores the 21 February 2022 decision by the Russian Federation related to the status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter;

6. Demands that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally reverse the decision related to the status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine;

7. Calls upon the Russian Federation to abide by the principles set forth in the Charter and the Declaration on Friendly Relations;1

8. Calls upon the parties to abide by the Minsk agreements and to work
constructively in relevant international frameworks, including in the Normandy format and Trilateral Contact Group, towards their full implementation;

9. Demands all parties to allow safe and unfettered passage to destinations outside of Ukraine and to facilitate the rapid, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance for those in need in Ukraine, to protect civilians, including humanitarian personnel and persons in vulnerable situations, including women, older persons, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, migrants and children, and to respect human rights;

10. Deplores the involvement of Belarus in this unlawful use of force against Ukraine, and calls upon it to abide by its international obligations;

11. Condemns all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and calls upon all parties to respect strictly the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 2 and Additional Protocol I thereto of 1977, 3 as applicable, and to respect international human rights law, and in this regard further demands that all parties ensure respect for and the protection of all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities;

12. Demands that all parties fully comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law to spare the civilian population, and civilian objects, refraining from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and respecting and protecting humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations

Istanbul Peace Talks  March 29-10

Agreement from Russia to scale down military operations in Kyiv and northern parts of Ukraine
Agreement from Ukraine to have a neutral status but with international guarantee it would be protected from attacks
Proposals to include a 15 year consultation period on the status of Crimea


**Proposal 1:** Proclamation of Ukraine as a neutral state with guarantees under international law to implement non-aligned and nuclear-weapon-free status. Possible guarantor states: Russia, Great Britain, China, USA, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland, Israel. Other states may also join the treaty.

**Proposal 2:** Ukraine's international security guarantees under the treaty do not apply to Crimea, Sevastopol and individual areas of the Donbass. The parties must define the boundaries of these territories or agree that each side understands them in its own way.

**Proposal 3:** Ukraine will not join any military alliance, will not station foreign military bases or contingents, and will conduct international military exercises only with the consent of the guarantor states. For their part, the guarantor states reaffirm their intention to promote Ukraine's membership in the European Union.

**Proposal 4:** The Guarantor States and Ukraine agree that in the event of aggression, armed attack against Ukraine, or military operation against Ukraine, each of the Guarantor States will, after urgent and immediate consultation between them (which will take place within a maximum of three days), in exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (in response to and on the basis of a formal request by Ukraine), provide assistance to Ukraine as a permanently neutral state. It will do so by taking the necessary individual or collective measures without delay, including closing the airspace over Ukraine, providing the necessary weapons, and using armed force to restore and then maintain the security of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state.

**Proposal 5:** Any armed attack (military operation) and any action taken in response will be reported immediately to the UN Security Council. These actions will be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**Proposal 6:** The mechanism for implementing security guarantees to Ukraine will be regulated in the treaty after additional consultations between Ukraine and the guarantor states, taking into account protection against possible provocations.
**Proposal 7:** The treaty will be provisionally applied from the date of its signature by Ukraine and all / or the majority of the guarantor states. The treaty will enter into force after Ukraine's status as a permanently neutral state is approved by an all-Ukrainian referendum and the relevant amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution are made and ratified by the parliaments of Ukraine and the guarantor states.

**Proposal 8:** The treaty proposes to note the parties' desire to resolve the issues related to Crimea and Sevastopol within 15 years through bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. It is also proposed to note that Ukraine and Russia will not resolve the issues of Crimea and Sevastopol militarily, but will continue their political and diplomatic efforts to resolve this issue.

**Proposal 9:** The parties will continue their consultations (involving other guarantor states) to prepare and agree on the provisions of the treaty on security guarantees for Ukraine, the modalities for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops and other paramilitary formations, opening and ensuring the safe functioning of humanitarian corridors on a permanent basis, and the exchange of bodies and release of prisoners of war and interned civilians.

**Proposal 10:** The two parties consider it possible for the presidents of Ukraine and Russia to meet to sign a treaty and/or make political decisions on the outstanding issues.
Italy’s 4 point Peace Plan May 20 2022

Italy presented a four-point peace plan this week to United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres to end the conflict in Ukraine. The plan calls for local cease-fires to allow for civilian evacuations, and creating the conditions for a general cease-fire leading “to a long-lasting peace,” Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio said on Friday, according to the Associated Press.

The first step in the peace plan, according to the newspaper, is a cease-fire and the demilitarization of the front lines.

The second point is that Ukraine would be a neutral country, with its security guaranteed by a not-yet-identified group of countries. The contours of this part of the plan would be discussed at a peace conference.

The third point is a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine to clarify the future of Crimea and Donbas. The agreement would deal with cultural and language rights and guarantee the free movement of people, goods and capital. The plan, according to Repubblica, indicates that Crimea and Donbas would have almost complete autonomy, including in questions of defense, but would be part of Ukraine.

The fourth point would be a multilateral peace agreement between the European Union and Russia that would include a staged withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and the winding down of Western sanctions against Moscow.

General statement in support of Ukraine on Italian government website:

Italy condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, which is a blatant violation of international law and humanitarian principles. Italy highlights its unwavering support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, full sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognized borders and its proactive engagement within the Euro-Atlantic community efforts to support Ukraine. In line with the priorities of our diplomatic action, we call on Russia to immediately cease hostilities, ensure safe passage to civilians by agreeing and respecting humanitarian corridors, and to refrain from any action that may affect civilian and critical infrastructures or nuclear facilities.

Italy also continues to call on Russia to engage in meaningful dialogue and negotiations aimed at establishing a ceasefire and humanitarian measures with a view to elaborating a shared and sustainable solution to the conflict. Italy supports ongoing talks and contacts between Ukraine and Russia. We are aware of the wide gap between the sides’ positions, but remain encouraged by their willingness to continue engaging. To that end, Italy will continue to exert pressure on Russia by engaging in the multilateral sphere to ensure Russia’s isolation in light of its wanton disregard for the values, principles and norms of the international order, and to pursue its accountability for the gross violations it has committed and continues to perpetrate. During its mandate as Chair of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe, Italy presided over the Committee’s decision that ruled that membership of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe ceased as from 16 March.

In the OSCE, Italy joined the decision to activate the OSCE Moscow Mechanism on Human Dimension to establish a mission of experts to address the human rights and humanitarian impacts of the Russian Federation’s invasion and acts of war on the people of Ukraine. Italy supports action by the EU aimed at isolating and putting pressure on Russia in the various WTO groups and meetings as well as to suspending concessions or other obligations with respect to the Russian Federation, such as the most-favored-nation treatment. Likewise, it supports EU action to suspend the accession process of Belarus.

At the same time, Italy is urging key players to push Russia to exercise restraint and move closer to a diplomatic solution of the crisis through peace talks. Italy is working with like-minded partners to detect, prevent, monitor and react to Russian disinformation and information manipulation and interference. Italy joined more than 40 partners in the referral of the situation in Ukraine to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in order to expedite investigations on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed in Ukraine. In response to the request made by Prosecutor Khan, Italy has committed a voluntary contribution of half a million Euros to the Trust Fund established by the Office of the Prosecutor and expressed availability to deploy several experts to support the Court’s investigations. It is also providing an additional contribution to the Trust Fund for victims.

Together with its partners, Italy affirmed its support for the proceedings initiated by Ukraine against Russia before the International Court of Justice. With a joint statement issued on 13th July, Italy expressed its intention to intervene in the proceedings to safeguard the correct interpretation of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Italy was among the main sponsors of the resolution on the “Aggression against Ukraine” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on March 2, and took part in its drafting group. Italy was also among the main sponsors of the Resolution on Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on March 24, and took part in its drafting group. Italy joined the Group of Friends of Accountability following the aggression against Ukraine.

Within the Human Rights Council (HRC) Italy actively supported Ukrainian initiatives to address ongoing violations of human rights and to promote accountability. At the beginning of March Italy supported the request to hold an urgent debate on the human rights situation in Ukraine and was among the first co-sponsors of the HRC resolution, which established an independent international Commission of Inquiry (Col) to investigate all alleged violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, which are occurring in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. On the occasion of the 49th HRC session, together with other 50 countries (including all EU MS, US and UK), Italy also joined a cross-regional joint statement promoted by Poland expressing deep concern over the deteriorating human rights situation in Russia.

Also within the HRC, together with other 54 Countries, including all EU MS, Italy has supported the convening of the Special Session on the deteriorating human rights situation in Ukraine stemming from
the Russian aggression held on the 12th of May that led to the adoption of a Resolution co-sponsored by all EU MS and adopted with a large majority (33 votes in favor, 2 against and 12 abstentions), which further details and strengthens the mandate of the CoI. We continued to raise the attention on the human rights situation in Ukraine also during the 50th session of the Council (13 June – 8 July), including by intervening in our national capacity in the interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner on the human rights situation in Mariupol. Italy co-sponsored the Decision, recently adopted by UNESCO Executive Board, to alleviate the consequences of war on Ukraine’s Heritage. Moreover, Italy is following the delicate issue of replacing the Russian venue and Chairmanship of the World Heritage Committee June session.

Italy voted the suspension of all activities run by the OECD with Russia and a consequent decision by the OECD Council was adopted. Moreover, Italy, as Chair of the 2022 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting, has proposed to discuss the crisis in Ukraine at the MCM in June, the most important yearly meeting of the Organization; the proposal was accepted. In the EU framework, Italy constantly supported the decision of the Commission to release a first contribution of 1 billion euros to support Ukraine’s short-term financial needs. Italy has also contributed to the approval of the regulation of the Council of the EU of 24 May 2022 allowing for temporary trade liberalisation and other trade concessions with regards to certain Ukrainian products, a measure which can significantly support Ukraine’s economy.

Document available here:

Statement of support available here:
The Vatican: Reaching a Just and Lasting Peace in Ukraine June 6-7 2022

Statement by Participants of the Science and Ethics of Happiness Study Group
Jesus taught the world that peacemakers are blessed, for they are the children of God. As war rages in Ukraine, the world needs peacemakers to help the warring sides to choose peace over continued conflict. The US, European Union, Turkey, China, and other countries should help both sides to feel secure in a negotiated peace agreement. For Ukraine, security means that a peace agreement will not be followed by renewed Russian threats or incursions. For Russia, security means that withdrawing from Ukraine will not be followed by the eastward expansion of NATO and heavy armaments into Ukraine. Peace, in short, means a neutral Ukraine that is secure in its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

Pope Francis has put his plea for peacemaking in plain and powerful terms:
I renew my appeal to those who govern nations: do not lead humanity to ruin. Please! Do not lead humanity to ruin!

His All-Holiness Patriarch Bartholomew has declared:
We call upon all parties involved to pursue this path of dialogue and respect for international law, in order to bring an end to the conflict and allow all Ukrainians to live in harmony. Arms are not the solution.

The aim of peacemaking in Ukraine is not merely a negative peace – that is, a peace without justice – but a positive peace, based firmly on the four pillars of moral relations between states recognized by Saint John XXIII in his magisterial Pacem in Terris: truth, justice, willing cooperation, and freedom (Paragraph 80). Such moral relations are needed not only between Russia and Ukraine, but also between Russia, the US, and the European Union. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is no doubt in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and international law. Russia's differences with Ukraine should certainly have been worked out through negotiations backed by the UN Security Council, with the security interests of all countries respected. Now, the grim realities of the ongoing battle, with neither side likely to win a decisive military victory, should push both sides to the negotiating table as soon as possible to avoid the prolongation of the war and to reach a peace with justice.

The war in Ukraine is likely to evolve into a war of attrition and end to as either a frozen conflict or a negotiated peace, rather than as an outright victory of one side over the other. A negotiated peace would be a superior outcome than the sacrifices of a war of attrition and a frozen conflict for both the peoples and governments of Ukraine, Russia, the US and EU, and the rest of the world. If the war ends as a frozen conflict, Russia would continue to occupy a sizable part of eastern and southern Ukraine, while Western sanctions against Russia would remain in place. Trade and investment between Russia and the West would remain blocked, turning into a general contraction of world trade and development. Arms and military personnel would also continue to flow into Ukraine from outside sources.
If the war instead ends in a negotiated peace, further heavy casualties among the civilian population of Ukraine and the militaries of both sides would be avoided and the existence and independence of the Ukrainian state could be guaranteed against outside attempts to overthrow it. Most of the regions that Russia currently occupies would return to Ukrainian sovereignty, certain regions might become subject to special regulations, the Russian military would be withdrawn, and the Western sanctions would be lifted, allowing reconstruction and the implementation of a higher level of security for all the actors in the Ukrainian society and neighboring countries. The basic terms of a possible peace agreement were outlined in the second part of March when negotiations between the two sides were reported by both sides to be progressing well, and again more recently in Italy’s proposal of a four-part peace plan in late May.

In the negotiations in the second part of March, Ukraine suggested four points for a peace settlement: neutrality; international security guarantees for Ukraine; a prolonged period to determine conclusively the status of Crimea; and negotiations over “the complex issues of Donbas.” Italy’s Peace Plan also has four points: a ceasefire; Ukraine’s neutrality; ongoing negotiations over Crimea and Donbas; and multilateral negotiations within the OSCE and between Russia and NATO on regional security arrangements. While relying on the practical wisdom (phronesis) of the blessed peacemakers, based on the identifiable roots of the conflict, the negotiations in March, and the peace initiatives to date, we would suggest the following benchmarks for a ceasefire and positive peace agreement:

(1) Neutrality of Ukraine, i.e., relinquishing the national ambition to join NATO while recognizing Ukraine’s freedom to enter into agreements with the European Union and others;
(2) Security guarantees for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine provided by the P-5 members of the United Nations (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) plus the European Union and Turkey, which might include military transparency and restrictions of military stationing and large-scale exercises in border areas under international observation connected to the lifting of economic sanctions;
(3) Russian de facto control of Crimea for a period of years, after which the parties would seek through diplomacy a permanent de jure settlement, which might include facilitated access for local communities to both Ukraine and Russia, liberal border crossing policies for persons and trade, stationing of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and financial compensations;
(4) Autonomy of the Lugansk and Donetsk regions within Ukraine, which might include economic, political, and cultural aspects, to be further detailed within a short period of time;
(5) Guaranteed commercial access of both Ukraine and Russia to the Black Sea Ports of both countries;
(6) The phased removal of Western sanctions on Russia in conjunction with the withdrawal of the Russian military according to the agreement;
(7) A Multilateral Fund for Reconstruction and Development of the war-torn regions of Ukraine – in which Russia also participates – and immediate access for humanitarian relief;
(8) A UN Security Council Resolution to provide international monitoring mechanisms to support the peace agreement.
Towards a Positive Peace

President John F. Kennedy wisely observed that “Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process—a way of solving problems.” To solve problems, we need cooperation, and for cooperation, we need trust. Lasting peace, therefore, depends not only on formal treaties but also on the cooperation in communities, across ethnicities, religions, and nation states. The media also bears the responsibility that the drumbeats of war give way to words of peace. Religious communities are at the forefront of positive peace. Religious communities bring people together in the spirit of human dignity and justice under God, and have the ability and mission to bring people together across faiths and ethnicities as well. The Catholic Church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine are the pillars of a positive peace between Russia and Ukraine, and within the diverse communities within Ukraine, and can play a crucial role in the needed reconciliation process as a path to positive peace.

We commend the religious leaders of all faiths to support Russia and Ukraine to seek a positive peace, and to abide by the words of Isaiah:

_They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore. Isaiah 2: 3-4. Addendum. Further Considerations Even if fighting continues to rage, neither Russia nor Ukraine is likely to achieve any outcome superior to a negotiated peace. Nonetheless, the terms outlined above will certainly provoke the following four claims, to which we offer our response._

Claim 1. Ukraine has the right to choose to join NATO

While the OSCE Charter (para 8) recognizes the right of OSCE member states to choose their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, states are also obliged “not [to] strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States.” Instead, they committed to create a common OSCE security area “free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security” (para 1), in which “no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability .... or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.” (para 8) To that end, NATO member states and the Russia Federation have committed in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) to keep strategic restraint and stability through arms control commitments and by enhancing mutual security cooperation and strengthening the OSCE as the common security organization. Moreover, NATO is not obliged to accept applications by other States to join the alliance but needs to weigh its implications for regional and strategic stability and mutual security. In Russia’s view, NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia would come at the expense of Russia’s security.

With the intended NATO enlargement, the U.S. and its allies might have taken hold of the strategic base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, created new potential stationing areas for troops and missiles closer to the Russian heartlands, thereby undermining the strategic balance, and NATO forces would be
in a position to limit Russia’s access to the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean for its commercial and military purposes. These are age-old considerations that were at play in the Crimean War (1853-56) and are at play again today.

Moreover, while NATO describes itself as a purely defensive alliance, Russia’s views are otherwise. Russian leaders and diplomats have repeatedly expressed grave concerns over NATO’s bombing of Russian partner Serbia in 1999; the US-led “coalition of the willing” in the war against Iraq in 2003 over the objections of the UNSC; and the violation of UNSC mandates in the NATO allies’ bombing of Russian partner Libya in 2011 that led regime change and prolonged chaos. In Russia’s view, NATO serves the geopolitical interests of the US and allies well beyond its stated rationale of the collective defense of Western Europe made in the context of the long-ended Cold War. However, while taking seriously such Russian concerns, they do in no way justify a military aggression against a sovereign neighbor state.

**Claim 2.** Ukraine will soon recapture territories taken by Russia since the February invasion

Ukraine and its backers argue that Ukraine will win a war of attrition, pointing out the damage to the Russian economy from Western sanctions and the poor performance of the Russian military. Yet Russia is taking a significant amount of land, and continues to increase the occupied territories in the Donbas. According to the IMF, Russia’s GDP in 2021, at $1.8 Trillion, was roughly 9 times larger than Ukraine’s GDP, at $200 Billion. Since the invasion, Ukraine’s economy is in desperate condition threatening utter collapse, with a decline of perhaps 50% of GDP, while Russia’s economic decline is projected to be around 10%. According to some reports, Russia’s dollar export earnings have actually risen, not declined, because the sanctions have raised the world price of Russian export commodities, while Ukraine’s export earnings have plummeted. Ukraine’s prospects in a war of attrition therefore depend entirely on continued large-scale financial and military support from the West. Yet public support in the US and EU for further major appropriations is already waning, especially under the heavy burden of falling living standards resulting from the economic dislocations of war and sanctions.

**Claim 3.** Russia should be punished, not rewarded, for the invasion

Russia’s differences with Ukraine and with NATO should certainly have been worked out through peaceful negotiations. Yet when Russia tried to negotiate with the Biden Administration and NATO in 2021 over the question of NATO enlargement, the US and NATO responded that Ukraine’s prerogative to join NATO is non-negotiable. When Russia raised the issue of the failure of Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements, the European guarantor countries provided no support. These facts do not in any way whatsoever justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but they do help to explain them, and more importantly, help to indicate benchmarks that will help to end the war. Russia must also refrain from creating narratives denying the national identity of Ukraine and willfully reclaiming territories it asserts to be historically Russian, as this would lead to a prolonged war and destroy any chances for reconciliation and peace.

**Claim 4.** Russia and Ukraine are far from a negotiated settlement, so fighting will continue
The reasons for confidence in negotiations are the following. On the military front, the war has settled into an intense conflict in a narrow region of Ukraine (Donbas and southern coast line, 20 % of Ukraine’s territory). Gains on the ground by either side come at high costs. The Western fears that Russia will overrun Ukraine and then continue on to other countries is long over. On the other hand, the belief that NATO weapons will quickly push Russia from the battlefield have also been refuted. Moreover, the West’s sanctions, once considered the means to crush the Russian economy, have been shown to be of limited effectiveness, and with high costs to the rest of the world. Both sides have reached the condition of “painful stalemate,” which has long been considered a primary indication of the ripeness of conflicts for resolution. A negotiation would also dramatically reduce the risks of destabilization in societies of non-neighboring countries, in Europe and other continents for the social and economic consequences of a persisting conflict.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine is likely to improve on such benchmarks by continued fighting. Russia might be able to capture more Ukrainian territory at heavy cost to its military and the Russian economy, but it would not likely be able to convert occupation of that additional territory into a more advantageous peace agreement. Rather, the occupation of even more territory, or the unilateral annexation of the Donbas into Russia, would almost certainly lead to a frozen conflict in which the West’s sanctions regime would remain in place, hundreds of billions of dollars of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves would remain blocked, trade and investment between Russia and the West would be suspended indefinitely, and the financial burdens of reconstruction in occupied regions would fall entirely on Russia.

Ukraine too is unlikely to improve on these benchmarks by continued fighting. The US and other NATO countries have made clear the limits of the kinds of military and financial support that they will offer. Ukraine’s economy has already been ravaged, and even graver losses would ensue with continued fighting. Ukraine has already conceded the reality of NATO’s non-enlargement, but striking a deal on that point with Russia could secure significant benefits for Ukraine in the counterpart steps agreed by Russia. The greatest obstacle to a negotiated outcome is perhaps the fear of negotiations itself. Politicians fear that they will be attacked as appeasers and even defeatists if they call for compromise at the negotiating table rather than outright military victory.

This is why peacemakers are so vital at this stage. The role of His Holiness Pope Francis and United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, and other esteemed peacemakers, could be instrumental to this end. Supporters of peace must bolster the politicians who take the risk of seeking negotiations. Those like Prime Minister Mario Draghi, who recently put forward Italy’s proposals for peace, deserve our deep commendation. We must mobilize civil society organizations and the global public opinion in favor of peace and call for an Alliance for Peace.
Signatories

Jeffrey D. Sachs, President of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network and University Professor at Columbia University
Anthony Annett, Gabelli Fellow at Fordham University
Maria Paola Chiesi, Science and Ethics of Happiness Study Group
Richard Falk, Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus, Princeton University
Ana Marta Gonzalez, Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Navarra
Nina Khrushcheva, Professor of International Affairs at The New School
Anatol Lieven, Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Mario Marazziti, Former Deputy and President of Human Rights Committee, Italian Parliament
Romano Prodi, Former Prime Minister of Italy and tenth President of the European Commission
Wolfgang Richter, Senior Associate in International Security at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Richard E. Rubenstein, University Professor of Conflict Resolution and Public Affairs at George Mason University
Michael von der Schulenburg, Former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General in UN Peace Missions
Anna Sun, Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Duke University
William F. Vendley, Vice President for World Religions and Spirituality at the Fetzer Institute and Secretary-General Emeritus at Religions for Peace

Document available here:
https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/ljyky5p69dhcrmx8epskjc7zh9d9n42
The NPT Review Conference August 26 2022

Delegates Broadly Condemn Russian’s Federation’s ‘Dangerous Nuclear Rhetoric’. After four weeks of work, the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ended this evening without reaching agreement on substantive conclusions and recommendations, due to the Russian Federation’s opposition to a summary document presented by the presidency, the adoption of which required consensus. This marked the second Review Conference in a row, after that of 2015, which has failed to produce a substantial outcome document, and many delegations deplored this failure, while affirming that it did not call into question the content of the Treaty itself, nor the achievements of previous Review Conferences. The next Review Conference will be held in 2026.

After beginning late due to several postponements and a suspension, the closing session was marked by the opposition of the Russian Federation to the draft final report presented by the Conference President, Gustavo Zlauvinel (Argentina). The text, he explained, represented “the best effort that I have been able to make to respond to the differences between States parties that have been communicated to me, in particular during the consultations, during this review conference”, before adding: “Unfortunately, I was only made aware of one State party’s specific objections today at midday. Consequently, at this late stage of the procedure, they could not be taken into account within the framework of this project.” Speaking in defense of his text, Mr. Zlauvinel explained that he had “sought to reconcile the positions expressed in a fair and balanced way, in order to reach a result which, in my opinion, should achieve consensus”. He acknowledged that it is not a perfect document, nor one that contains everything that all delegations wanted, but justified those efforts by the fact that “we are at a moment in history where our world is increasingly torn apart by conflict, and more alarmingly, by the ever greater prospect of the unthinkable — nuclear war”. At such a time, he stressed the importance of seeking to amplify what unites the parties, not what divides them. “We all want to achieve a world without weapons, avoid dangerous regional conflicts and see the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals,” he continued, and further expressed hope that the draft document and — perhaps more importantly — the full and rapid implementation of the commitments it contains “can help us to move closer to all the objectives I have just mentioned”.

The Russian Federation’s delegate then asked for the floor to explain that there was “no consensus” and that his country had “objections on key points which have a political dimension and are known to all”. He explained that these objections related to “five paragraphs” of a text which contained more than 140 and proposed not to delete them, but to amend them. The delegate did not quote the paragraphs. Without citing the Russian Federation, five of the paragraphs of the draft document referred to the Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia.

While the Russian Federation’s delegate was the only one to speak openly against the draft outcome document — thus preventing its adoption — he stressed repeatedly in his closing statement that his country was not the only one to criticize the text. “No one is satisfied with the content of the document,” he said, deeming it “weak on the merits”. It would not have been realistic to expect an
ambitious and forward-looking document, he continued, but the text “could have, at a minimum, reflected the reaction of States parties to the factors and events that occurred during the review cycle and which had a significant impact on the three pillars of the Treaty”. However, he continued, over the past seven years, there have been many such events, which will have implications for the next review cycle. He cited in particular the closer military and technical cooperation between non-nuclear-weapon States and their nuclear-weapon strategic partners, the fact that “non-weapon countries participate in joint nuclear missions”, as well as the fact that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members agree to use nuclear weapons, which are now deployed in countries that are not members of the alliance.

That delegate said the report could not be adopted due to “irreconcilable differences” between the positions of the different States. Consensus is not an end in itself, he stressed, and a document that does not satisfy any of the States parties was likely to have even more negative effects than the absence of any document. He further condemned that the Conference had been “taken hostage” by “Ukraine and its sponsors”, whom he accused of having made repeated comments throughout the Conference that were “anti-Russian, politicized, unjustified and misleading on the situation in Ukraine”, and that they were entirely responsible for the absence of positive results. However, among the 30 or so delegations that took the floor for closing statements, some strongly criticized the Russian Federation for its invasion of Ukraine.

In a joint statement by the representative of France, some 40 countries, including those of the European Union, United Kingdom, Norway, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Republic of Korea, Ukraine and Türkiye again condemned “the unjustifiable and unprovoked war of aggression”. Reaffirming their support for the Treaty, those States condemned “the dangerous nuclear rhetoric of the Russian Federation, its actions, as well as its provocative declarations on the raising of its nuclear alert levels” — actions which were deemed incompatible with the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races released at the beginning of January. They condemned the Russian Federation’s actions “carried out in complete disregard of its international obligations and commitments and in violation of the security guarantees it granted to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in the context of the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State”. They further expressed deep concern about the serious threat to the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities due to their seizure or other actions by the Russian Federation armed forces, which significantly increase the risk of nuclear accident or incident, and demanded that it immediately withdraw its armed forces from Ukraine and return full control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and all nuclear installations located within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine to Ukrainian authorities.

Individually, several countries have insisted that one State, the Russian Federation, opposed the consensus. The representative of Ukraine saw this as a demonstration of the “isolation” of that State, adding: “We are not alone in our fight for survival.”

The representative of Cuba condemned a lack of political will to progress in various fields, in particular that of nuclear disarmament, as requested by all the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement which are parties to the Treaty. Denouncing the weak content of the draft final document relating to
that pillar of the Treaty, he considered that its adoption would not have made it possible to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons.

The Permanent Observer for the Holy See called for delegations not to overestimate what consensus would have brought to the draft final document, which had “serious weaknesses”, contained no meaningful commitments to nuclear disarmament, and nothing ambitious or new to reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence — nor anything ambitious to deal with the humanitarian and environmental consequences of a nuclear detonation.

The representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the seven member States of the New Agenda Coalition, explained that the group would have reluctantly joined consensus, noting the draft outcome document did not restore the balance provided for in article VI of the Treaty — described as a grand compromise between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. The delegate recalled that article VI presents the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations, whatever the circumstances — a legal obligation and moral imperative.

Many speakers also wondered about the consequences of this new failure of the States Parties to adopt a substantial final document, seven years after the first setback in 2015.

The Russian Federation’s representative said he did not share the opinion of those for whom the absence of a final document would represent a failure of the entire review cycle, with potential effects on the viability of the Treaty. The report was not adopted, but delegations had discussed in depth a whole range of issues on which compromises were now necessary, such as the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East or strengthening peaceful nuclear cooperation. This set of discussions forms, for Moscow, extremely valuable work which constitutes a solid basis for continuing work after the Conference.

The United Kingdom’s delegate stressed that the Russian Federation’s lone opposition, trying to blame everyone but itself for the absence of a final document, did not reduce the four weeks’ work to nothing. There remains more unity than division, even though many existing disagreements have been exacerbated by the illegal war — but final document or not, the Treaty will remain the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation system.

The representative of the United States noted there was “real frustration in the room”, and that his country remains fully committed to its obligations under article VI. He stressed that the document had underplayed the situation at the Zaporizhzhia power plant, and that the real risk of a radiological disaster there was solely due to the Russian Federation’s war of choice. “Russia is the reason we do not have consensus today,” he stated, and the last-minute changes that delegation demanded were not minor. If those issues are not central and germane to the Treaty, “then I don’t what is”. However, he concurred that “we do agree on more than we disagree”. His delegation will continue to build on the good work done in August, such as condemning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear tests, ensuring access to civilian nuclear facilities and supporting the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “We all need this Treaty and everything it represents.”
The representative of the European Union, in its capacity as observer, recalled that the binding measures contained in the Treaty or adopted at successive Review Conferences remain valid, including IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards system, which “will continue to be a fundamental element of the non-proliferation regime”. The bloc and its member States will spare no effort to ensure the full implementation of the of the Treaty and to work for its universalization. China’s delegate expressed regret over the absence of an agreement, but considered that the Review Conference had made it possible to better understand the changes that have taken place in the international situation over the past seven years — also citing that very useful exercise in multilateralism.

In his closing statement, Mr. Zlauvinel cited the negative impact on the international context, nevertheless highlighting the political will to negotiate in a spirit of good faith. Although he expressed deep regret over the lack of consensus, he considered that, “despite the great differences in position which were evident”, the delegations had, for four weeks, “reiterated the importance of the Treaty and the need to maintain its credibility”. But, he cautioned, to retain that credibility, States parties must uphold Treaty obligations and commitments made at previous Review Conferences.

The States parties to the Treaty agreed that the next Review Conference will be held in 2026, after three sessions of the Preparatory Committee, respectively in 2023 in Vienna, in 2024 in Geneva and in 2025 in New York. Review Conferences are held in principle every five years, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the tenth Conference, originally scheduled for spring 2020, had to be postponed several times. Holding the eleventh Review Conference in four years will make it possible to partially compensate for the delay in the timetable. The Conference President noted there will therefore be no break between the end of the current cycle and the start of the next.

States parties also agreed to establish a Working Group on Strengthening the Review Process, open to all States parties, to review and make recommendations to the Preparatory Committee for the eleventh Review Conference on measures that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the Treaty review process.
Mexican Peace Proposal

Statement delivered by Marcel Ebrard Casaubon at the Security Council New York, 22 September 2022

Madam President: I thank Secretary-General António Guterres and the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Karim Khan for their valuable presentations. I recognize the presence at this meeting of the Security Council of the Prime Minister of Norway, as well as other colleagues, Ministers and high-level representatives. We wish also to thank France and yourself, Madam Minister, for convening this debate on a flagrant breach of the United Nations Charter, which has ravished international peace and security. Seven months after the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the multiple social, economic and political implications are evident. As is the case in every armed conflict, the greatest cost is paid by civil society. This war has generated massive displacements of people both within Ukraine as well as to neighboring countries, especially of women and children. The material damage is also severe and onerous. Since the breakout of hostilities, Mexico has insisted on searching for a diplomatic solution and addressing the humanitarian dimension of the conflict, without it being subordinate to political considerations, and in strict adherence to international humanitarian law.

In this Council, we presented along with France, a draft resolution in this regard, which was then submitted to the General Assembly and was adopted on March 24 as resolution E11/2. Today we reiterate that humanitarian assistance continues to be both indispensable and a priority. We have also sought, to the best of our ability, to support the Secretary-General's mediation efforts and, together with Norway, we adopted on May 6 a Presidential Statement to that effect. This statement is clearly insufficient, but it is the only public pronouncement that this Council has been able to issue since the beginning of the conflict. The advance of the war, with its substantial human and material costs, and the increase in humanitarian needs derived from the conflict, such as humanitarian shortages and the high cost of fuel, in the face of winter, urgently require a solution through diplomatic channels, a ceasefire. This requires the political will of the parties and the commitment of the international community. The need to respect international law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law must therefore be emphasized.

Accountability is also another fundamental pillar of the multilateral system, of the rule of law and of peace. Therefore, without pretext or conditions, those responsible for crimes committed in Ukraine must be brought to justice. In this regard, the work of the International Criminal Court to investigate allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity is essential. We will follow the progress of these investigations with the utmost attention. Of particular concern is the dimension of the nuclear risk arising from clashes around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Ensuring its integrity and proper operation is critical to avoid the ultimate catastrophe. We endorse the recommendations made by the International Atomic Energy Agency following its technical inspection, which must be complied with immediately, and we support the calls to create a security perimeter around the plant.

Finally, we recognize the value in the signing of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. FAO indices show that grain prices in the last two months have begun to decline. This is a sure sign of the value of diplomacy. Even in
the midst of war, dialogue and agreements are possible. It is also essential to be able to guarantee fertilizer access to global markets, and we are encouraged to know that concrete steps have already been taken in that direction. We fully recognize the leadership of the UN Secretary General and the Turkish President for their roles in the signing of these agreements.

Madam President: Since the beginning of the conflict, my country’s position is underpinned on our constitutional principles of foreign policy, which are in line with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular: non-intervention, the pacific settlement of disputes and the prohibition of the threat or use of force. There is no room for ambiguity. The peaceful coexistence of States depends precisely on their respect of these principles. There can be no exceptions. In the course of the last months, we have been clear in reiterating the importance of Article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State. From our own experience, Mexico knows and understands well the importance of having the basic guarantee of being able to live without the threat of being invaded by another country. Any action that violates this principle is illegal and illegitimate. The purpose of this Organization, and the mandate of this Council, is to prevent people from suffering from the scourge of war. But this can only be achieved through dialogue, diplomacy and the building of effective political channels. Indifference is unacceptable, just as it is equally unacceptable to simply lament the fact that the Security Council has so far been unable to fulfill its essential responsibility in this case. The reasons why this Council can become dysfunctional are well known. It is up to us to correct them. The time is ripe to seriously consider the structural reforms required to do so.

Madam President, Excellencies: Based on its pacifist vocation, Mexico believes that the international community must now channel its best efforts to achieve peace. In this regard, I would like to share the proposal of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to strengthen the mediation efforts of Secretary-General António Guterres through the formation of a Caucus for Dialogue and Peace in Ukraine, with the participation of other Heads of State and Government, including, if possible, His Excellency Narendra Modi and His Holiness Pope Francis. Its objective would be very clear: to generate new mechanisms for dialogue and create complementary spaces for mediation to foster trust, reduce tensions and pave the way to a lasting peace.

The Mexican Delegation will continue with the necessary consultations, with the sole purpose of being able to contribute, as an impartial actor and in good faith, to generate broad support for the mediation efforts led by the Secretary General; as well as the aforementioned Caucus, the establishment of which will take place, with the support of those UN Member States that wish to do so. As Mr. Secretary General has said, it is time to act and commit to peace. To resign ourselves to war is to gravitate towards a precipice.

Thank you very much.
Document available here:
Resolution of the IPB Council in Ghent

Negotiating Instead of Shooting:
Thoughts on Diplomatic and Peaceful Solutions in and around Ukraine
The war in Ukraine is causing suffering, death, and devastation. With every day that the war drags on, more people are killed, physically injured, or psychologically traumatized. With each passing day, the risk that the war will escalate or the spread to other states increases. Every day the global famine intensifies; about one tenth of the world’s population suffered from famine already before the Ukraine war. Every day of war is one too many - the war must end now as soon as possible. A way out of the spiral of military escalation is needed.

The developments of the last weeks (referendum, annexation of the four districts to Russia, partial mobilization, intensified bombardments, attacks on the Nord Stream pipeline and Crimean Bridge) aggravate the confrontation situation and make a diplomatic solution more difficult and complicated. However, this is still possible and necessary; the nuclear threats that could lead to nuclear war - 60 years after the Cuban Missile Crisis - imperatively require the use of diplomacy and negotiations. Peace logic instead of war logic is the challenge. For this, a ceasefire and peace negotiations are essential.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine is illegal under international law. The responsibility for the war lies with the Russian government – nonetheless the developments leading up to the war must be properly assessed. At the same time, it requires joint action to end the war and build peace. As South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor put it, "The world has a responsibility to ensure peace." Yet despite the immeasurable suffering caused by the war, no direct negotiations are currently taking place between the Russian and Ukrainian governments. The threat of years of a war of attrition looms, with catastrophic humanitarian consequences for the people of Ukraine and around the world.

What is needed is a diplomatic solution.
The following are IPB’s proposals and considerations for a ceasefire, as well as ways to resolve the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, or Russia and NATO. It is considered that the countries of NATO bear a share of responsibility for the increasing tensions between Russia and NATO since the 1990s. It must also be kept in mind that the responsibility for the number of further victims and the danger of nuclear escalation do not fall on one party alone.
The proposals take into account various approaches at the bilateral, multilateral, scientific and civil society levels.
The UN must play a central role throughout the peace process.
The following suggestions are taken into account:

■ The Minsk 1 and Minsk2 agreements (Normandy format).
■ Istanbul 10-point plan between the Ukraine and Russian governments, dated March 29, 2022
■ Peace plan of the Italian government from May 2022
■ Vatican international working group led by former PM Prodi and US economist Jeffry Sachs "just and lasting peace in Ukraine" of June 2022
■ Russian draft treaty of December 2021
(Summary of documents at www.ippnw.de/startseite.html)

From these considerations, IPB proposes the following considerations for a new regional and European peace order. These suggestions are coming from the international peace movement and should be taken into consideration by international policymakers and politicians:

■ First, a balanced ceasefire must be reached; this will require mediators. Possible mediators are the UN, the Pope, neutral states, and others that are announcing plans for a ceasefire and negotiations. Negotiations about fair transitional conditions of a ceasefire suitable for all stakeholders must start immediately.
■ The ceasefire could be the starting point for the creation of one or more demilitarized zones in which UN blue helmets could be stationed; special attention should be paid to the regions around the nuclear power plants. Demilitarized zones should include presence by non-partisan civil and unarmed military monitors.
■ The withdrawal of Russian troops must be agreed upon gradually and in coordination with other peace policy agreements. The gradual withdrawal could be linked to the gradual lifting of sanctions.
■ Comprehensive autonomy under UN monitoring is agreed for the Donbas region (Donetsk/Lugansk). This includes an amendment to the Ukrainian constitution with recognition of basic economic, cultural, and political autonomy for the regions.
■ Neutrality of Ukraine and rejection of joining NATO as agreed in the Istanbul negotiations.
■ Ukraine needs security guarantees. These could be provided by guarantor powers, preferably by those that are not party to the conflict, such as India, Turkey, or South Africa, but possibly also mixed with partners from both sides;
■ For the solution of the "Crimea", a referendum under international/UN control could be held after a few years referendums could be held under international supervision.
The German state Saarland, which was under French administration for ten years after the war, could serve as a model. The de facto control of Crimea by Russia is accepted for a few years before a longer-term political and diplomatic solution is sought.
■ As a positive incentive, an international reconstruction program for all regions affected by the war, a multinational fund for reconstruction and development should be established. An immediate fund under UN control for humanitarian aid will be established.
■ Economic, political, cultural and social sanctions will be gradually dismantled; in their place, economic relations will be established and expanded according to mutual benefit of both sides.
■ As a further incentive for Russia, negotiations on strategic arms control in Europe will be launched. The goal is at least the withdrawal of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons from Europe, or better, a Europe free of nuclear weapons.
■ As a longer-term perspective, a debate begins on a new European security architecture based on the basic ideas of the "common security policy with the goal of a European security and peace conference
2025 Conference on a new pan-European security architecture. We need a European peace architecture, a common house of Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

- The contact between the people will be made possible again immediately; meetings, discourses, and an exchange will be intensified and made possible free of repression.
- All countries should consider giving sanctuary, not necessarily asylum, to all people fleeing conscription and compulsory mobilization into military forces as a positive action to end armed conflict.
- All countries should recognize human right to conscientious objection to military service in all parts of societies (including indigenous populations) according to international human rights standards.
- Language which demonizes any party should be avoided, although acts against the peace must be acknowledged.

All this will not succeed without intensive engagement and actions of the peace movements and other social movements, which create a social atmosphere of cooperation and dialogue. They must actively contribute to ensuring that the logic of peace prevails over the logic of war. Therefore, all steps of peace development should be accompanied by own events/actions of the peace and social movements. Furthermore, these movements must expand and intensify their protests militarization in their own countries and throughout Europe.

Berlin, 2022/10/19